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Abstract
Who's afraid of banning corporal punishment of children? The use
of corporal punishment for the education of a child is one of the most
loaded and disputed questions among jurists, psychologists, sociologists,
educators, and the general public. Modem approaches hold that the use
of corporal punishment should be prohibited because of the physical and
emotional damage it causes and its inefficiency. According to other
approaches, if corporal punishment is administered moderately and with
due composure, it is not harmful and could even be useful in setting
boundaries for children.
How does the law in different countries treat corporal punishment?
In most countries of the world, corporal punishment is permitted so long as
it is moderate and reasonable. Sixteen countries, mostly in Europe, have in
one form or another, prohibited the use of corporal punishment by law. In
most countries, the prohibition was enacted into legislation, while a few
prohibited corporal punishment through a court ruling. In a small number
of countries, the prohibition was enacted into criminal law. Most
countries, however, enacted the prohibition as a human right of children
not to be exposed to physical punishment as a matter of civil law (family
acts and human rights statutes).
Has the time not come in common law countries, too, to introduce a
ban on corporal punishment, deriving from principles of human rights, the
children's dignity, and their rights over their body? Maybe corporal
punishment is a fundamental part of a child's right to get a proper
education and of the parents' duty to educate and correct the children, as
long as the spanking is not harsh. This Article discusses four existing
models of legal regulation of corporal punishment drawn from Roman law
and the law in England, the United States, Canada, Israel, Cyprus, Sweden,
Finland, Denmark, Norway, Austria, and Germany. The models differ in
the level of legal intervention in the parent/child relationship as expressed
with the issue of corporal punishment. The Article concludes by
proposing a desirable model that reflects the most appropriate way to ban
corporal punishment.
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The desirable model moves cautiously between two poles. One
rejecting intervention and proposing leaving the family dynamic as is. The
second pole supports massive intervention because of the damage to the
rights of the child. It does not take an exaggerated view of the rights of the
individual on account of the rights of the family and vice versa. The
proposal relies, inter alia, on educative measures, not only legal measures,
and emphasizes the fact that a dispute in the family cannot be treated as a
dispute between strangers.
The importance will be particularly for countries, mostly in North
America, Africa, Asia, and some European countries, which have not yet
by law prohibited corporal punishment in the family unit. However, this
article has ramifications also for those legal systems which have already
taken such a step and prohibited the use of corporal punishment one way
or another. The desirable model to be proposed at the end of the essay
will be adaptable, mutatis mutandis (among others), for further parental
behaviors and not only corporal punishment.
In addition to family and comparative law, the Article will draw on and
contribute to the literature in a number of fields, including law and social
change, multiculturalism and the law, the intersection between domestic
relations and criminal law, and international human rights.
I. Foreword
Who's afraid of banning corporal punishment of children?
The use of corporal punishment for the education of a child is one
of the most loaded, difficult, and disputed questions among jurists,
psychologists, sociologists and educators and, indeed, the general public.
Modem approaches hold that the use of corporal punishment should be
prohibited because of the physical and emotional damage it causes, its
inefficiency, and because if the conduct reaches the point of an assault,
the parent is not to be granted protection. Other approaches provide
otherwise, namely, that if corporal punishment is administered
moderately and with due composure, it is not harmful and could even be
useful in setting boundaries for children.
What is, actually, corporal punishment? Sociologist Murray
Straus defines corporal punishment as "[t]he use of physical force with
intention of causing a child to experience pain, but not injury, for the
correction or control of the child's behavior."' Straus differentiates
between mild and moderate corporal punishment designed to accord the
child a painful experience for the purpose of correcting their conduct or
1. MURRAY A. STRAUS & DENISE A. DONNELLY, BEATING THE DEVIL OUT OF
THEM: CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN FAMILIES 4 (1994) [hereinafter BEATING
THE DEVIL].
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controlling their behavior, and an injury inflicted on the child through
use of this measure. Seemingly, causing the child an injury does not fall
within "corporal punishment" but is recognized as violence in all
respects. The American Academy of Pediatrics defines corporal
punishment as, "[t]he application of some form of physical pain in
response to undesirable behavior.",2 Whereas, behavioral science experts
define corporal punishment, quoted in one of the Canadian court rulings
to be discussed below, as, "[t]he administrating of one or two mild to
moderate 'smacks' with an open hand, on the buttocks or extremities
which does not cause physical harm."
3
Corporal punishment, therefore, is the hitting of a child by their
parents or educators for the sake of their education, usually with a light
blow on the buttocks or hand because the child has misbehaved, deviated
from the good path, or not complied with their wishes and their
instructions and did not accept their authority. It is usual to say that
reasonable and mild corporal punishment is a deterrent. In other words,
corporal punishment accustoms children not to repeat acts, shapes their
character, cultivates fitting qualities, and trains and directs their path
through life for good, at least until they can stand on their own two feet
as independent persons, in terms of the steps they take, their discretion
and ability to make correct decisions. The traditional premise is that
moderate, reasonable, and infrequent corporal punishment can be used, if
at all and only when necessary, as an essential means once in a while to
draw clear boundaries of conduct for the child in order to bring them up
and forge and guide them on the correct and sure path through life.
How does the law in different countries treat corporal
punishment? In most countries of the world, corporal punishment is
permitted so long as it is moderate and reasonable. Some sixteen
countries, mostly in Europe, have prohibited by law, in one form or
another, the use of corporal punishment for the education of children. In
about ten of these countries, the prohibition was passed between 1998 and
2006. In most countries, the prohibition was enacted into legislation,
while a few countries prohibited corporal punishment through a ruling of
the Supreme Court. A small number of countries, enacted the prohibition
into criminal law. Most countries, however, enacted the prohibition as a
human right of children not to be exposed to physical punishment
specifically as a matter of civil law through Family Acts and the like.
2. American Academy of Pediatrics, Committee on Psychological Aspects of Child
and Family Health, Guidance for Effective Discipline, 10 PEDIATRICS 723 (1998)
[hereinafter GUIDANCE FOR EFFECTIvE DISCIPLINE].
3. Canadian Foundation for Children, Youth and the Law v. Attorney General,
[2002] C.R.D.J. 86 [hereinafter Ontario Judgment], aftd, [2004] S.C.C 4 [hereinafter SC
Judgment].
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Has the time not come in common law countries, to introduce a ban
on corporal punishment, deriving from principles of human rights,
children's dignity, and children's rights over their body? Perhaps
corporal punishment is a fundamental part of children's rights to get a
proper education and of the parents' duty to educate and correct the
children, as long as the spanking is not harsh.
In this article, five models will be discussed. Four existing models
and an integrated model, which is being proposed as a satisfactory
solution for the issue, through which it will be possible to discern the
difference between the various perceptions. The models differ in the
level of legal intervention in the parent/child relationship as expressed
with the issue of corporal punishment.
First, two general approaches characterizing the legal attitude and that
of the social sciences to parent/child relationships will be reviewed, in an
attempt to review the current models and arrive at a more desirable model.
The Article will next examine the legal models. The importance will be
particularly for countries, mostly in North America, Africa, Asia, and
some of the European countries, which have not yet prohibited corporal
punishment in the family unit in their laws. However, this Article provides
some ramifications also for those legal systems that have already taken
such a step and prohibited the use of corporal punishment one way or
another. The desirable model proposed at the end of the essay will be
adaptable, mutatis mutandis, for further parental behaviors and not only
corporal punishment.
The Article is a reflection of an important dilemma regarding several
issues, including: law and social changes, legal intervention in
parent/child relations, multiculturalism and the law, and the intersection
between domestic relations and criminal law. This dilemma and a possible
solution will be presented via comparative law.
II. Two Dominant Approaches in Parent/Child Relationships and their
Impact on Shaping Legal Models
In modem society, unequivocal attitudes are being heard more and
more against the use of parental behaviors that harm children, even if
allegedly undertaken for the interest of children, but inflict damage on
them in different plains and different ranges, harm their self-respect, and
are contrary to justice and equality. The behaviors are also ineffective
and the harm they cause can exceed their benefit.4 Unlike the traditional
4. This approach is based mainly on the words of liberal thinkers who believe that
the rights of the individual have to be above all. See generally Charles Taylor,
Multiculturalism and 'The Politics of Recognition', in MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING
THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION (Amy Gutmann ed., 1992); JOHN RAwLs, A THEORY OF
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view of society, the individualistic approach views the individual in the
family unit per se and not solely the family as a whole. The
individualistic approach aspires to seeing the child as an independent
entity for almost all purposes, even at the expense of gnawing at the
parents' authority, despite the natural inequality inherent in the structure
of the classic family unit, at the center of which are "strong" parents and
"weak" children. This approach follows from the human rights
approach. If the actions of the parents hurt the child, the individualistic
approach holds that the parents should be restricted, even when acting for
the benefit of the child and out of a positive educational motive.5 In
other words, there is an attempt to shake free from traditional
paternalistic approaches, which leave to the parents the decision as to
what is in the interest of their child,6 even if such is done apparently in
the name of a positive goal of forging children as independent entities
who know boundaries and learn to accept discipline and values, and also
if the injury is mild, not serious.
Promoting the independence of children and the fear of causing
them injury as a result of certain parental behaviors are central
parameters and of particular importance in a multi-cultural society
because they lead to the viewpoint that, even if the educational path with
which the parents are familiar and know or are in accordance with their
religious, community or ethnic ascription, but differ from what is
acceptable in that society, the law must decry it. In its stead, desirable
norms should be formulated, which are consistent with human rights and
enforce them in an egalitarian manner on the whole population.
An opposite approach, which is a kind of collectivist approach,
espouses giving a dynamic to the family unit to behave more naturally and
freely. The point of view of the family approach is paternalistic and is
expressed in the granting of legitimacy to moderate parental behaviors that
are in the interest of the child, even if the child does not at any given
moment understand that to be the case, because it is assumed that parents
know what is best for their child. That being so, the family approach holds
that the parents' steps are not to be restricted, nor their authority prejudiced
or their discretion limited. Thus, the benefit of parental behavior must
exceed the damage inflicted, not seriously harm the child, and the motive
JUSTICE (1971); John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical, 14
PHILOSOPHY AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS 223-251 (1985); RONALD M. DWORKIN, TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE
(1980); JOHN LOCK, Two TREATIES OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 141-54 (1955).
5. See generally C. Harry Hui, Measurement of Individualism-collectivism, 22 J. OF
RES. IN PERSONALITY 17-36 (1988).
6. See Michael D.A. Freeman, The Morality of Cultural Pluralism, 3 INT. J. OF
CHILD. RTS. 1 (1995).
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for those actions must be positive and educational. This approach does not
focus only on the child but also on the authority of parents to educate their
children within the family unit as a whole with its special status in society
and on the children themselves and their greater good in the long term.
This approach understands that the family is not a collection of individuals
and that parents have a function to educate their children, to raise and set
boundaries for them, and, to this end, unpleasant and mildly hurtful
sanctions are sometimes necessary. The child is indeed an independent
personality, but they are not always capable of differentiating between good
and bad, and the hand of the parents has to direct and guide them. Children
cannot be granted absolute autonomy in the making of decisions which
concern them.
Thus, corporal punishment and other behaviors, such as
confinement of the child to their room or grounding the child, serve only
as a means rather than a goal in itself. This approach favors increased
parental authority, expressed in a more forgiving and understanding
attitude towards the use of educational methods such as corporal
punishment, which are sometimes inevitable, so long as practiced in a
measured and moderate manner. This is not tantamount to encouraging
blows for the sake of education. The assumption is that no parent wants
to harm their child, even to a small extent. It cannot, however, be
deduced from this that corporal punishment is not legitimate. Indeed,
this approach attempts to reach a balance between the status of children
and the authority of parents, inter alia, by attempting to prove that this
method of education can be effective if it abides by reservations designed
to limit, as far as possible, the harm to the child. An educational means
which harms a child excessively or is proven to be ineffective, should, in
any event, not be used.
This same space for parental discretion will allow any society, sector,
community, and family to bring children up according to the traditional
methods of education acceptable to them, so long as they do not cross red
lines. In other words, so long as the relative freedom of action does not
inflict damage on the child, or, alternatively, so long as the benefit in the
inculcation of boundaries and frameworks, expressed in reasonable,
measured, and moderate methods of education and punishment, the
physical punishment will exceed any immediate and minuscule damage
that might be inflicted on the child. This approach is certainly paternalistic
for it calculates what is in the interest of the child from the point of view of
his education and normal development both in the short term and in the long
term.7
7. Cf Shahar Lifshitz, Alternative Law of Spousal Relationships in the Coming
Generation: 'Libertarianation' and the 'Binding' Court, 17 MECHQAREI MISHPAT 159
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Can a middle approach be adopted in parent/child relationships? This
Article will attempt to point to a model that finds the correct balance
between the individualistic approach and the family approach, under the
influence of the Relational Worldview of Bush and Folger.8  Their
approach is an interesting middle ground, holding that the individualistic
approach is incorrect because it focuses only on the individual and
separateness. According to Bush and Folger, the collectivist approach, 9
which abolishes the rights of the individual through exaggerating the
importance of the collective, is also incorrect. Bush and Folger favor
adoption of a relational worldview, which although does not rule out the
individualistic perception but, rather views it as just one dimension in the
complex totality, they understand that human nature does not focus only
on separate self-interests, but also on responses and relationships to the
society in which it belongs. Nor does the relational worldview rule out the
collectivist perception and it certainly takes the interest of the collective
into account. In other words, the collectivist approach recognizes that a
person is contemporaneously both separate and connected, and one should
lead to an integration of a compound type rather than of a mixture type,
i.e., a full chemical reaction between the two perceptions, between
separateness and belonging, and the finding of connecting points between
the approaches out of an understanding that each approach is, on its own,
lacking and unbalanced. With all due respect, this is a correct and
balanced approach that has a place in western society and relies on
increasing recognition of human rights and the rights of children while the
law does not always succeed in making such a fine balance. The
collectivist approach needs to be dressed up to have a legal meaning in this
discussion.
The current legal interventions in parent/child relationships can be
assigned to four main molds: minimal intervention, moderate
intervention, strict-penal intervention and civil-human rights
intervention. Finally, I shall present a fifth, and desirable, model. These
models are in fact legal expressions of the individualistic or family
approaches or a combination of the two of them to some extent or
another.
The prevailing models will be presented in the fourth section. First,
the minimal legal intervention model, which accords autonomy to the
family and to those heading it to treat it virtually as they wish, will be
presented. The minimal legal intervention model upholds, to an extreme
(2002) (discussing the matter of relationships between spouses, the presentation of
approaches of the individual as against the family unit).
8. ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION:
RESPONDING To CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION 238-46 (1994).
9. Family, for this Article's purposes, but also tribal, communal, sectarian and so on.
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extent and almost without balances, a rationale that underlies the family
approach and supports the integrity of the family as evidenced by the non-
intervention of government in these relationships. In fact, a principle is
created here of the family autonomy that prevails over the rights of the
child and over any consideration for their well-being and best interest.
This model is extreme and hardly exists today in any modem western
society.
The model of moderate legal intervention that exists in most
common law countries maintains a balance between the two former legal
models and, in fact, between the family approach and the individualistic
approach, since it constitutes a sort of bridge between them. The model
tries to strike a balance between the principles of the rights of the child,
the best interest of the family, and the best interest of the child. The
model of moderate legal intervention leaves sufficient authority in the
hands of the parents, so long as their actions are in the best interest of
their child, and are moderate and reasonable. Thus, the balance of the
moderate legal intervention model is closer to the family approach. The
model agrees in principle that corporal punishment could sometimes
cause harm and be ineffective, but it does not deny its legitimacy where
its effectiveness is large and its damage minuscule, as reflected in a
series of restrictions and reservations presented in the moderate legal
intervention model. The central question the moderate legal intervention
model poses is the extent of its success in implementing the delicate
balances between the different approaches.
Subsequently, two models that ban corporal punishment, each in a
different way, will be presented. The strict-penal model of legal
intervention is the opposite of the minimal intervention model. The strict-
penal model is a reflection of the individualistic approach. In seeking to
forbid corporal punishment sweepingly, almost absolutely and through
criminal law, the implications of which are very serious, this model
emphasizes the damage that could be inflicted on children even by
moderate and light corporal punishment, the lack of its effectiveness as a
way of education, the harm to the body and self-respect of children
inasmuch as it humiliates and belittles, and the "slippery slope" that could
easily bring it to the point of abuse. This model is strict and has hardly any
balances with the family approach and is, therefore, excessively sweeping
and can hurt the family even though it is based on good intentions.
The model of civil-rights legal intervention is built from a sweeping
declaration, that follows the individualistic approach, as against moderate
enforcement, which follows the family approach, and it attempts to find
gentle solutions, some of which are not "purely" legal. The rationale of
the model of civil rights legal intervention is a sweeping declaration
alongside moderate enforcement, that will have to be examined in light
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of its having to be adjusted for modern, western legal systems.
After reviewing the existing models and presenting them in a
critical light, each from a different direction, a proposed solution which
is actually a fifth model will be presented. The reference is to an
intermediate model, which combines advantages from some of the
existing models and adopts patterns from the two general approaches, the
individualistic approach and the family approach. The model will
attempt to reinforce the structure of the modern family as an autonomous
unit and will suggest building a system of arrangements, interwoven
within the existing law, but that has their own uniqueness and is
compatible with the nature of the family territory and the essence of the
relationships between parents and children.
III. The Prevailing Legal Models: Description and Critiques
A. The Minimal Legal Intervention Model: Roman Law
The first model presented is one of minimal legal intervention in
parent/child relationships that will be illustrated by Roman law.1° This
system of law espoused a minimal to zero legal intervention in the acts of
parents vis-A-vis their children, even if the acts were very grave. Roman
rule invested most of its efforts in public management, including
international and inter-religious relations, paving roads, and constructing
bath-houses and houses of pleasure, but did not view itself as able and
willing to handle and arrange the small daily issues of every family unit
throughout the empire. Roman rule left the internal management of each
family in the hands of the father of the family, virtually undisturbed: "The
Rule of the Father" (Patria Potestas).
Because of its weakness and limitations, which did not permit it to
deal with family affairs, the Roman government decided to leave extensive
powers to the father of the family. Fathers had almost total control over
their children, which continued beyond their reaching maturity and even
after their marriage. Except in rare cases, fathers enjoyed both extensive
ownership over their children and non-intervention of the government in
10. See generally JANE F. GARDNER, WOMEN IN ROMAN LAW AND SOCIETY 5-29, 67-
68, 137-54 (1990); BARRY NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 80-82 (1962);
Mason Thomas, Child Abuse and Neglect Part I: Historical Overview, Legal Matrix, and
Social Perspectives, 50 N.C. L REv. 293, 295 (1972); Eric T. Lanham, Suing Parents in
Tort for Child Abuse: A New Role for the Court Appointed Guardian Ad Litem?, 61 UKMC
L. REV. 102 (1992); SHMUEL AIZENSTADT, THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF ROMAN LAW 15-
18, 43-44, 205-09 (1954); REUVEN YARON, RESEARCH IN ROMAN LAW, 3-25 (1968);
Mordechai A. Rabello, On Patria Potestas in Roman and Hebrew Law, 85 DINEI ISRAEL 85-
112 (1974). The impact of Roman law on the law of European countries is discernible from
the year 1100 and particularly in the years 1495-1900.
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their deeds vis-A-vis members of their families. 1" Injuries to children
through violence (or neglect) were not amongst those rare cases and so did
not merit legal recognition, leaving fathers unexposed to sanctions.
Furthermore, the Patria Potestas contained judicial authority for fathers
over members of their families who followed their orders. This authority
was termed the "Rule over Life and Death" (Just Vitae Necisque Potestas),
because in certain periods Roman law permitted fathers, in the opinion of
most researchers, to punish their children even with death ("Rule over
Death"). Roman law also accorded fathers, in certain opinions, the power
of clemency in cases where the punishment for the deeds of the child
within the family or outside it justified, in the opinion of the government,
capital punishment ("Rule over Life"). This power was later taken from
fathers and they were left only with "Rule over Death." In certain periods
there was some governmental intervention, but it was toothless because it
merely condemned the father for exceeding his powers and exercised no real
sanctions. Later, certain sanctions were legislated for the father and
jurisdiction was determined in a special "family court" (Domesticum
Iudicium), although in the first stage only extreme cases (mainly for capital
punishment of children) were heard in these courts.
This arrangement of Roman law delegated certain powers of the state
onto the shoulders of the father for the purpose of running the family unit
almost as he saw fit, without any rights for the children, except for extreme
cases where the state intervened as a sort of appeals court in the father's
decision regarding a death penalty for a child. Accordingly, as the agent of
the government and a clerk executing its word, the father was given the
obligatory authority to punish members of the family at the public level
(for example, for offenses committed against others, such as theft) as well
as extensive authority at the level of the internal family relationships. The
father, as an agent of the government, was in effect given a free hand to
run the affairs of the family, including the education and punishment of the
children. He was not indicted if he injured the child by his deeds or
omissions, and was thus able to control his children as he saw fit. The
Patria Potestas expressed, therefore, an intentional government
disregard of, and even explicit permission for, corporal punishment for
the education and "training" of children, for chaining and imprisoning
them, for abuse, utilization, maltreatment, various tortures, and even
abandonment and serious neglect.
2
11. Meyer v. Nebraska 262 US 390 (1923); Rabello, supra note 10 (explaining that the
ownership and possession of children in ancient systems of law differed from their sense in
modem law. In ancient systems, they were very close to the concept of guardianship rather
than the children being by way of property).
12. Mason P. Thomas, Jr., Child Abuse and Neglect Part I: Historical Overview,
Legal Matrix and Social Perspectives, 50 N.C. L. REv. 293, 294-295 (1972); TONY
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"The Rule of the Father" expresses, in fact, the development of a
separate law for the family within the general Roman legal system in
which, in connection with the issues discussed here, fathers were also
judges and executioners, almost without any right to the child of appeal to
an instance of the state. Over the years, Roman law underwent changes
but, even at the end of the rule of the Roman Empire, legal and
governmental intervention in the life of the family and in the "Rule of the
Father" was too little.
Thus, the Minimal Legal Intervention Model is incompatible with
the family in modem society. Roman law adopted an extreme and
inappropriate interpretation of the famous saying, "a man's home is his
castle," by granting almost complete immunity for the father.
Despite the focus on Roman law, minimal state intervention
expressed in the issue of corporal punishment was also accepted and
extensively rooted without any reservations in various other cultures,
whether for reasons of exorcising an evil spirit in the child by beating
him or for reasons of inferior status, which children, servants, or women
had. This approach was similar to the rationale underlying the Roman
Patria Potestas.13 The basis for the existence of that rationale for a
separate law for the family unit, albeit in a less sharp form, exists even in
the models to be presented below, even if the grounds for those modem
approaches differ from what was at the basis of the Patria Potestas.
From Roman law, which stood for the convenience and interest of the
government, not even a hint of a solution can be extracted regarding the
question of the desirable model. The separateness of the family has to
appear at a much lower level and from the starting point of family sanctity
rather than government convenience. One can perhaps progress from such
a principle and arrive at less extreme models that create a certain space for
family autonomy and retain family harmony, dignity, and privacy, but also
VAUGHN HEINEMAN, THE ABUSED CHILD: PSYCHODYNAMIC UNDERSTADING AND
TREATMENT 15 (1998); Steven G. Neeley, The Psychological and Emotional Abuse of
Children: Suing Parents in Tort for the Infliction of Emotional Distress, 27 N. KY. L.
REv. 689, 697 (2000); Yaron, supra note 10, at 5.
13. Similar (although not identical) arrangements also existed in ancient Greece and
elsewhere. See Steven G. Neeley, The Psychological and Emotional Abuse of Children:
Suing Parents in Tort for the Infliction of Emotional Distress, 27 N. KY. L. REv. 689, 697
(2000); Marcia A. Kincanon, The Child Abuse that Doesn't Count: General and Emotional
Neglect, 22 U.C. DAvIS L. REV. 1039, 1045 (1989); Rabello, supra note 10, at 88, 92. See
also THE DOMOSTRO: RULES FOR RUSSIAN HOUSEHOLDS IN THE TIME OF IVAN THE
TERRIBLE (Carolyn Johnston Pouncy eds. & trans., 1994) (providing tips to the head of the
family on the question of the proper timing for the beating of women, children and servants
in Sweden and Russia in the sixteenth century). See SUSAN H. BITENSKY, CORPORAL
PUNISHMENT OF CHILDREN: A HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATION 250 (2006) (discussing the
legal situation in Italy in the thirties and forties of the twentieth century and the
"authoritarian father").
[Vol. 26:1
2007] WHO'S AFRAID OF BANNING CORPORAL PUNISHMENT? 69
leave sufficient space for legal intervention. The kernel of special family
laws should, indeed, express a unique arrangement for the family unit, but
also an arrangement which will integrate into the general law in effect and
not one that creates a totally separate realm, blocking almost every form of
legal-governmental intervention. The arrangement has to find the balance
between the degree of privacy required for the family unit and the rights of
the individuals in it, including the rights of the children, the weak organ in
the family. Such a balance is not achieved by the minimal intervention
model. Patria Potestas does not pass the test of reality since it easily,
almost necessarily, gives birth to exploitation of the weak by the strong and
to a breach of order in the family. The autonomy of the family unit has to be
restrained, clear boundaries have to be set for it, and it has to be subject to
the supervision of authorities.
At the same time, one should not necessarily go to the other extreme
and rely only on the individualistic approach. A fitting balance between
the different considerations will obviate not only the damage to the
family unit and to society as a whole which could result from application
of the minimal intervention model, but also damage resulting from an
opposite legal situation in which the government is too active and
interferes in the family unit in general and in parent/child relationships in
particular in an excessively sweeping fashion.
B. The Moderate Legal Intervention Model: Reservations for
License-English, American, and Canadian Law
According to this intermediate model, the moderate legal intervention
model, the state does indeed have to intervene in parent/child relationships
and not leave it to Patria Potestas and the like. However, such
intervention must not be absolute. The law has to provide balances
between the individual approach and the family approach and permit
corporal punishment with certain reservations, but not in any instance and
at any price. The law has to understand that parental activity to educate
children is important and its wings should not be clipped. At the same
time, the law must not ignore children's rights, lest the parents misuse their
dominant status. The rule underlying this model, therefore, is the
dynamism of the family unit, but is restricted (unlike the minimum
intervention model) by the rights of the child.
Moderate and reasonable corporal punishment in the family
framework is permitted in most countries of the world. Such is the
situation in the countries of North America, South America, Africa, New
Zealand, and most of Europe. In some of these countries, a general section
has been enacted permitting light corporal punishment. In other countries,
mainly the common law states, the permit for parents to use corporal
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punishment on their children is slightly more detailed (in court rulings or
legislation) and contains the foundations of being moderate and reasonable
in the use of force.' 4  In other countries, however, this is even more
detailed or explicit in judicial decisions which have delineated it and
specified what the actual parameters are that comprise these foundations.
15
This model leads to creating a special orientation for the family,
which while not being as extreme as the Patria Potestas, nevertheless
takes into account the importance of not putting the brakes on the
dynamic of the family unit in consequence of exaggerated legal
intervention. The understanding that a massive reduction of parental
authority would hurt the family, and that this authority is not to be
sacrificed on the altar of children's rights, is a proper understanding. The
application of this model, however, is problematic. The focus will be on
a number of legal systems that have adopted moderate intervention in the
matter: English law, American law, and Canadian law.
English law adopted the path of moderate legal intervention and
permits parents to use corporal punishment on their children, allowing a
criminal and civil defense.16  Section 7 of The Children and Young
Person's Act creates an exception to the prohibition on battery in Section
1 of this act, in stating that "[n]othing in this section shall be construed as
affecting the right of any parent.., or any other person having lawful
control or charge of a child or young person to administer punishment to
him." 1 7 The courts have laid down a permit for corporal punishment so
long as it is moderate and reasonable.' 8 However, reservations were set
to this license. The list contains: (1) examination of the circumstances
of the case; (2) examination of the age and strength of the child; (3) the
length of the beating; and (4) the gravity of the beating.1 9  These
14. In Spain, Section 154 of the Spanish Civil Code determines that "[Parents] may
administer punishment to their children reasonably and in moderation." 154 C.C.
15. See infra pp. 13-19.
16. See David Orentlicher, Spanking and Other Corporal Punishment of Children by
Parents: Overvaluing Pain, Undervaluing Children, 35 Hous. L. REV. 147, 168-70 (1998)
(discussing the situation in England); Scott A. Davidson, When Is Parental Discipline Child
Abuse? The Vagueness of Child Abuse Laws, 34 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 403,405-07, 410-
11 (1995); Brenda Hale, Understanding Children's Rights: Theory and Practice, 44 FAM.
COURT REV. 350 (2006) (arguing that the Convention is not a binding document which has
been taken into national law in England); CHRIS BARTON & GILLIAN DOUGLAS, LAW AND
PARENTHOOD 150-52 (1995); Peter Newell, Respecting Children's Right to Physical
Integrity: What the World Might Be Like, in THE HANDBOOK OF THE CHILDREN'S RIGHTS:
COMPARATIVE POLICY AND PRACTICE 219 (Bob Franklin ed., 1995) ;Tamar Ezer,
Children's Rights in Israel: an End to Corporal Punishment, 5 OR. REV. INT'L L. 139,
162-64 (2003).
17. Children and Young Persons Act, 1933, c 12, § 7 (Eng.), amended by Children
Act 1989.
18. R. v. Hopley (1860) 175 Eng. Rep. 1204.
19. R. v. Woods, (1921) 85 J.P. 272; see also Gillick v. West Norfolk and Wisbech
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reservations are inadequate, and the use of instruments such as a belt or
shoe is not explicitly prohibited.
The rationale behind this arrangement is the understanding that, in
the framework of parental obligations vis-A-vis their children, parents
may adopt disciplinary measures, even those that contain the use of
force. If the parent acted out of a proper motive and the force he used
was not exaggerated, then there should be no intervention in his
discretion. The reasonableness test has an advantage, according to this
approach, in that it allows flexibility to look at the circumstances of each
20
and every case.
Some changes have been made in the last few years; however, the
UK has not prohibited parental corporal punishment. There is more
emphasis on the need to differentiate between mild corporal punishment
and abuse and serious violence, especially if it causes physical or
emotional harm or is done with the use of implements. There is now a
real effort to ban corporal punishment in schools.
2
'
In addition, a bill of the Liberal-Democratic Party was passed in the
2003-2004 parliamentary session, in which the reasonable chastisement
defense will not apply at all, even with respect to parents, if the corporal
punishment resulted in "[g]rievous or actual bodily harm, wounding, or
unnecessary suffering or injury to health., 22 It will be interesting to see
how the courts interpret the new legislation. For example, will hitting
with an instrument now be forbidden? Will permissible corporal
punishment be hedged in a better way with additional reservations?
In American law, the situation is similar from certain points of
view. The Supreme Court of the United States has ruled that the various
states do not have a constitutional obligation, under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, to protect
individuals from violence exercised against them by other individuals
and that this also applies to incidents of violence of parents vis-A-vis their
children.23 This finding could impact the path of American law on the
issue of corporal punishment.
The American Model Penal Code, which serves as a basis for penal
legislation in many United States jurisdictions, permits parents to use
Area Health Authority (1986) A.C. 112 (providing that the ruling that hitting a child
above the age of sixteen years is forbidden in any situation).
20. See Orentlicher, supra note 16; Davidson, supra note 16.
21. NICOLA TAYLOR, International Developments, in THE DISCIPLINE AND GUIDANCE
OF CHILDREN: MESSAGES FROM RESEARCH 101, 111-2 (Anne B. Smith et al. eds., 2005).
22. Hale, supra note 16, at 357-58.
23. DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Serv., 489 U.S. 189 (1989)
(discussing a father's abuse of his child who was in his care. The child and mother filed a
claim against the welfare services and some of its workers); see BITENSKY, supra note 13, at
262-64 (providing a discussion and critiques of the DeShaney judgment).
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corporal punishment vis-A-vis children so long as the force is applied for
the purpose of "promoting the welfare of the minor" and the force is not
exaggerated.24 Sixteen states in the United States have legislation
explicitly permitting corporal punishment in the family unit, while
judgments of the courts in other states permit corporal punishment.
Corporal punishment is not prohibited in any United States jurisdiction.25
The law permitting corporal punishment also revolves around
reasonableness, moderation, and necessity, which are all requirements
specifically for an educational purpose in a form that recalls the path of
English law. Among the restraints enumerated in the different states, one
can find the preparedness of the child to accept the punishment, the age of
the child, the physical and mental state of the child, and the force and
necessity of its use. In some of those states, it is emphasized that the
purpose of the restraints is to differentiate between corporal punishment
and child abuse or any other cruel or inhumane conduct.26 In foster
families, however, corporal punishment has been prohibited in the
majority of United States jurisdictions. 27
The confusion and uncertainty in many of the states are great. For
example, a court in Florida noted that it is very difficult to draw the line
between light corporal punishment which is permitted and child abuse
which is, of course, prohibited.28 Bitensky justifiably criticizes the
existing law because in various United States jurisdictions, if a child is
beaten and the beating leaves no marks on their body, it can be assumed
that the parent will be acquitted.29 It is no wonder that the vast majority
of the American public still supports educational spanking in the family
unit and very high percentages of those asked in surveys point to support
for this method and actual use of it. For example, research has indicated
that ninety percent of parents in the United States justify the use of
corporal punishment for the sake of educating their children, while
eighty-five percent of them would prefer not to utilize this method if they
had some other reliable and effective method. 30 At the same time, other
24. Model Penal Code, § 3.08 (2001).
25. Kandice K. Johnson, Crime or Punishment: The Parental Corporal Punishment
Defense-Reasonable and Necessary, or Excused Abuse?, 1998 U. ILL. L. REv. 413, 436;
Ronnie Warburg, Corporal Punishment in School: A Study in the Interaction of Halakha
and American Law with Social Morality, 37 TRADITION 57 (2003); BITENSKY, supra note
13, at 265-75 (reviewing at length, the special-intermediate situation in Minnesota).
26. BITENSKYsupra note 13 at 266.
27. Id., at 288; Leonard P. Edwards, Corporal Punishment and the Legal System, 36
SANTA CLARA L. REv. 983, 1017-20 (1996).
28. State v. McDonald, 785 So. 2d 640, 647 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
29. BITENSKY, supra note 13, at 268.
30. Anthony M. Graziano, Jessica L. Hamblen & Wendy A. Plante, Subabusive
Violence in Child Rearing in Middle-Class American Families, 98 PEDIATRICS 845-48
(1996).
[Vol. 26:1
2007] WHO'S AFRAID OF BANNING CORPORAL PUNISHMENT? 73
research indicates a decrease in support for this phenomenon in recent
years.3
The main problem with American law is that those restraints on
corporal punishment in the penal law, which were created in legislation
and/or court rulings, are not arranged and summarized as in Canadian law,
as will be shown below. Most of the reservations noted above in the
presentation of these systems of law can be collected from within
American law.32 It is, however, difficult to find states that unite all these
reservations together in their law.33 Each state views matters slightly
differently and emphasize various components or other restraints on the
use of corporal punishment. Even the definition of reasonableness varies
from state to state, because some states emphasize the subjective facet and
others the objective facet.
There is also a difference in the perception of the parental mens rea,
which requires that the parent act intentionally, consciously, negligently, or
recklessly for a conviction and examines whether the parent acted with the
intent to educate their child. Some states examine the acts of the child that
resulted in corporal punishment, while others concentrate only on the acts
of the perpetrating parent.34  This situation means that many forms of
conduct that are forbidden in other common law countries, such as
Canada, are permitted in some United States jurisdictions. The very fact
that these states are independent and lack any direction from the federal
courts means that this outcome is quite expected mainly in everything to
do with various interpretations of courts in the different states.
Canadian law permits a parent to hit a child for educational
purposes, if they meet the restraints of moderation and reasonableness.
The source for these requirements is found in Section 43 of the Canadian
Criminal Code of 1985. Court judgments hedged it around and
construed it by reduction. Section 43 provides that "[e]very
schoolteacher, parent or person standing in the place of a parent is
justified in using force by way of correction toward a pupil or child, as
the case may be, who is under his care, if the force does not exceed what
31. BITENSKY, supra note 13, at 24 n.24, 270.
32. The reservations include the motive for the beating, the age of the child, the size of
the child, the physical and mental condition of the child prior to the beating, the frequency
of the acts, the type of injury actually inflicted or which could have been inflicted and so on.
33. Thus, for example, a section of the law in the State of Alabama is detailed, but
would appear to grant wider discretion to parents. A section of the statute in Utah is
broad and specifies much detail in comparison with similar sections of statutes in other
states. In Ohio, there was some difficulty in reaching a decision in various courts, for
example, does a bite, even if one-time, or a beating with a belt, constitute abuse or
corporal punishment. See BITENSKY, supra note 13, at 265-67.
34. Id. at 266.
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is reasonable under the circumstances. 3 5
The purpose of the permissible educational beating is to correct the
behavior of the child prospectively, rather than some reckoning and
vengefulness over his acts in the past. Section 43 actually leaves parents
and even teachers and those standing in for them (in loco parentis) some
discretion.36 Court rulings hedged the license in principle in the section
with reservations. Courts determined that there is to be no hitting out of
anger, in an inconsiderate way and out of a loss of control,37 and the
child is not to be threatened or frightened.38 According to court ruling,
factors are to be checked in the basis of reasonableness in the section.39
In practice, "reasonableness" means the circumstances of the case, the
age of the child,4 ° the extent of the child's understanding and his
acceptance of the punishment, their readiness to learn from the beating,
the force and seriousness of the beating,41 the injury inflicted on the child
in practice, if any, or the concern for such injury, and the beating is not to
be administered with a tool or instrument, but with the hands only.42
Courts and scholars have criticized the fuzziness of the
reasonableness basis in Section 4343 which resulted in a lack of
uniformity in implementing judgments. For example, some parents who
used slight force were convicted, while other parents who used
exaggerated force and painful measures were acquitted. Thus, it is not
clear to parents whether their actions are permissible. Further, the
section does not adequately protect children's rights.44
The issue was presented before the Supreme Court of Canada in 2004
in an appeal against a judgment of the Court of Appeals of the Province of
Ontario. 45 This was the high point of a process in which various social
35. Canada Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C 46 (1985).
36. See Joan E. Durrant, The Abolition of Corporal Punishment in Canada: Parent's
versus Children's Rights, 2 INT. J. OF CHILD. RTS. 129, 130 (1994).
37. R.v.D. W [1995] A. J. 905; R. v. D .H [1998] 0. J. 3347.
38. R. v. Komick [1995] O.J. 2939.
39. See R. v. Dupperon [1984] 16 C. C. C. 453; Ogg-Moss v. The Queen, [1984]
S.C.R. 173.
40. A child above the age of fifteen years is not to be hit. The age range, however,
has changed over time.
41. Sensitive body parts, such as the head, are not to be hit and there is to be no
kicking or strangling.
42. Ontario Judgment, supra note 3 (holding that a child under the age of two years
is not to be beaten).
43. As this basis has been construed, as stated in Dupperon case, supra note 39. See
also R. v. J.O.W. [1996] O.J. 4601; SC Judgment, supra note 3. For the criticism in the
literature, see Ezer, supra note 16, at 165.
44. R. v. J.O.W. [1996] O.J. 4601. For an extensive review of Canadian judgments
that acquitted parents who hit their children in cases which primafacie are hard. See the SC
Judgment, supra note 3, paras. 153-70.
45. Ontario Judgment, supra note 3.
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organizations, mainly the Canadian Foundation for Youth, argued that
corporal punishment is inconsistent with the Canadian Charter.46 The
respondents to the pleas were the Attorney-General, parent and teacher
organizations, and a Canadian organization called "Coalition for Family
Autonomy. ,47  In a majority opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed the
Court of Appeals' judgment.4 8 The Court also approved the rulings with
respect to the eight reservations of beating, as laid down in various
judgments and mentioned in the Ontario Judgment (although here it was
ruled that a child under the age of two years and over the age of twelve
should not be hit, and also that a handicapped child should not be hit); the
lack of practical difference between corporal punishment administered by
parents and that administered by teachers; the successful balance that
Section 43 of the Criminal Code draws between the interest of the child
and the state, and the desire of parents and teachers to permit a certain
space for the education of children and school pupils without their conduct
being stigmatized as criminal, following which balance the section is not
contrary to the Charter.
Two of the justices were of the opinion that Section 43 runs counter
to the Charter 49 and to the basic rights of children, and should, therefore,
be repealed. One justice opined that Section 43 should accord immunity
to parents but not to teachers.
The majority acknowledged that, without Section 43, the said corduct
46. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, in IV CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 60-76 (Gisbert H. Franz ed., 1999) [hereinafter The
Charter/Canadian Charter).
47. It should be noted that matters may not be disconnected from the fact that Canada
is a blatantly multi-cultural society. The ethnic breakdown in Canada is as follows: 28% of
the citizens are of British origin, 23% of French, 15% other European countries,
26% mixed, 2% natives and 6% various foreigners and immigrants. The religious
breakdown is 98% Christian (of whom 42% Catholic, 40% Protestant and 16% other
Christians), 1% Moslems and 1% Jews. Throughout the country, there are two large
cultural communities: the natives, the aborigines (who are also termed "Indians"), who are
English-speaking, and the French-Canadians, mainly residents of the Province of Quebec,
who are French-speaking and seek isolationism for example in language, customs, and trade
marks. There have been attempts in Canada on this backdrop to resolve the problem of the
multi-culturalism and bridge the gaps with the residents of the Province of Quebec who are
demanding independence. See Taylor, supra note 4. The subject could certainly be of
relevance for this paper. A possible repeal of Section 43, as abolishing other cultural
characteristics, could constitute a true multi-cultural problem in Canada. One of the ways,
therefore, to maintain "industrial quiet" is to adopt a path of moderate legal intervention
which has place for the behaviors of sub-cultures so long as they do not overstep the
reservations laid down in the judgment. Durrant indeed notes that the repeal of the section
would not be welcomed by the public in Canada and proposes that such be done only at the
same time as, or following, an extensive educational and promotional public campaign. See
Durrant, supra note 36; Ontario Judgment, supra note 3, para. 19.
48. SC Judgment, supra note 3, para. 60, (citing the Report of the Canadian
Committee on Corrections, Toward Unity: Criminal Justice and Corrections 12-3 (1969)).
49. The Charter, supra note 46.
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would fall into the offense of battery in the Criminal Code,50 but reasoned
that its conclusion was based on the fact that Section 43 provides sufficient
filters to protect the interest, dignity and security of the child, which are
represented by the State. The section lays down limits and is not breached.
It prevents arbitrary enforcement and its goals are educating children and
correcting their ways, rather than punishing them for their past acts.
Parents and teachers must know that they have a certain area in which they
can and should comply with the obligation of education without fear of
penal sanctions. The majority recognized that the statement, "reasonable
under the circumstances," indeed seems overly general, but argued that the
section does not defend any action which is tantamount to causing injury
to a child. The majority provided that Section 43 should not be
disconnected from various factors, including the circumstances in which
there is a need for the imposition of discipline, the social consensus at a
given time, the opinions of experts, and legal commentary. When all these
factors are taken into account, the general basis of reasonableness assumes
a clear meaning, which allows penal sanctions to be imposed in a case of
parental behavior that deviates from what is permitted. Hence, the section
does not permit harsh and cruel behavior and is, therefore, not contrary to
the Charter.
The majority opinion actually adopted a family-paternalistic
approach in noting that children need an atmosphere of great security,
but depend on their parents and teachers for instruction and discipline.
This dependence is needed for the purpose of their natural development
and protection from injury they could inflict upon themselves. Section
43 is perceived by the majority as a successful integration by the
Canadian legislature of these two important interests. Its repeal might
cause a situation where "[m]en and women may have their lives, public
and private, destroyed; families may be broken up. 51
The minority opined that use of any force against children not only
hurts their dignity but turns them into real "second class" citizens and
creates age discrimination (between children and adults) that runs counter
to the principle of equality, the Charter and the rules of natural justice.
The role of the Court is to limit the widening of criminal liability which the
legislature made, apart from which the section contains a wide opening for
the use of great force and its ambiguity harms children. The authorities
should be protecting children, as a vulnerable and weak group in society,
rather than contributing to the perception of children as the property of
adults. The status of children should be compared to that of other groups
50. Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, ch. C 46, § 265(1) (1985) (Can.).
51. SC Judgment, supra note 3, para. 60 (citing the Report of the Canadian
Committee on Corrections, Toward Unity: Criminal Justice and Corrections 12-3 (1969)).
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in the population whom it was customary to punish physically, such as
women, servants, slaves, and prisoners, and for whom the custom has
changed in recent generations. It is not possible, says Justice Deschamps,
that children need corporal punishment for the purpose of their correct
upbringing. Children are not the property of their parents. The idea that
the body and dignity of children can be given up to the wishes of their
parents, even if they are mistaken, is unacceptable in his opinion. The
purpose of the section in its present form is actual defense of the rights of
parents and teachers, and not of children. Furthermore, the minority
opinion emphasized that the Canadian courts consistently failed to give a
uniform construction to the basis of reasonableness and were embarrassed
on the question of its interpretation, since this basis is associated with
public policy and individual parental sense and is always touched with
subjectivity and dependent on so many variables, particularly on the
background of cultural and religious beliefs. In the minority's opinion, the
majority's attempt to construe the basis of reasonableness by imposition of
various reservations is in effect a rewriting of the law (this being,
presumably, a criticism of non-separation of the legislative and judicial
authorities).
The minority opinion was not concerned with exposing parents and
teachers to lawsuits that would follow a possible repeal of Section 43,
because the Criminal Code contains sufficient general defenses. The
necessity defense applies to cases such as preventing a child from running
into the street or applying force to him. For example, if a child refuses to
receive an injection from a doctor; in any other instance, only minuscule
corporal punishment will earn a defense. Justice Binne, however, was in the
middle and concurred in part and dissented in part. He agreed with the
majority opinion with regard to parents and the minority opinion with regard
to teachers. Although Canada has not repealed the license in principle for
corporal punishment, it did conduct an informational campaign with the
goal of teaching parents of small children how to exercise discipline
without corporal punishment.
There is room to critique the moderate legal intervention model,
although in principal it constitutes an appropriate legal balance between
the family and individualistic approaches. American, English, and
Canadian law represent legal systems that provide a certain defense to
parents who have adopted physical punishment for the education of children.
Canadian law chose to set an explicit permit for corporal punishment, as an
exception to the general prohibition of hitting, but this permit is qualified
with various reservations. The reservations mirror the restraints pointed out
by scholars in social science literature supporting the family approach.52
52. Among these scholars is Prof. Diana Baumrind, a psychologist specializing in the
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American law in most United States jurisdictions, much like English
law, set overly fuzzy restraints. English law is a bit more specific, but is
still not sufficient. In American law, one can find more detailed
reservations, but this is mainly if one brings together the systems in the
various states. It is difficult to find states that have an orderly list of
reservations as in Canadian law, which leads to a lack of certainty and
confusion, often even within a particular state, and certainly in any
attempt to look at American law as a whole.
In none of the instances was there full satisfaction at the path
followed by these legal systems. In England, the subject of corporal
punishment merits an alert and occasionally penetrating public debate. It
is unclear whether the recent developments in legislation will satisfy the
public and end the dispute over the issue, so long as corporal punishment
in the family unit is not totally forbidden or at least more closely
development of children, from the Institute of Human Development at Berkeley University,
California (Diana Baumrind, Response: A Blanket Injunction Against Disciplinary Use of
Spanking Is Not Warranted by the Data, 98 PEDIATRICS 830 (1996); Diana Baumrind,
Parenting: The Discipline Controversy Revisited, 45 FAM. REL. 405 (1996); Diana
Baumrind, Robert E. Larzelere & Philip A. Cowan, Ordinary Physical Punishment: Is It
Harmful? Comment on Gershoff (2002), 128 PSYCHOL. BULL. 580 (2002)). In Baunrind's
opinion, corporal punishment for purposes of inculcating discipline in a child, administered
sensibly, can actually establish correct social behavior and better prepare the child for life
and protect him/her from sudden exposure to negative and painful features and behaviors
occurring outside the family unit. According to Baumrind, if a child grows up in a
"hothouse" in which the parents fail to react in the face of bad behavior or use "soft" and
insufficiently effective alternatives to counter it, the child is, in the final resort, hurt by the
reaction. If the child behaves in such a way outside the family framework, he will be
exposed to very harsh negative reactions without any prior preparation. From Baumrind's
research, it also follows that there is no substance to the argument of an inter-generational
cycle of violence with regard to light corporal punishment and that children's violence
stems, inter alia, not only from exaggerated corporal punishment but also from the failure to
use it at all, whether by parental choice or because of state law. Baumrind also presents
findings according to which children whose parents used moderate corporal punishment on
them were less violent vis-A-vis others. Baumrind sets clear limits and restraints on the use
of this method of education. Although Baunrind argues she personally opposes the hitting
of children as an educational method, her research shows that occasional use of a smack on
the backside of a young child in a family where the children are growing up in a loving
atmosphere, does not cause any long-term damage to the mental state of the child. On the
contrary, a rational smack on the buttocks is perhaps a necessary tool in the attempt to
educate a small child, particularly between the ages of eighteen months to six years.
Baunrind also argues that many researches carried out so far and showing the opposite
were not conducted scientifically and ignored additional possible influences on the child,
parent and family. Baumrind enumerates the following criteria making light corporal
punishment legitimate. The punishment should be an occasional smack, not frequent
beatings; a light and controlled blow, not a serious beating; a smack on the child's backside,
not on more sensitive organs; a blow administered for educational purposes and the
imposition of discipline and not one without reason; smacking is effective for forming the
conduct of children aged eighteen months to six years; the smacking takes place in a family
where the child is growing up in a loving atmosphere and a warm and supporting set of
relationships and not out of anger or rejection.
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restrained. In American law, criticism has been expressed in judgments
and in the literature in some states on the lack of uniformity amongst the
states in construing the term "reasonableness."
In Canadian law, there has been no upheaval but there are trends
that cannot be ignored. Canadian courts had some difficulty with the
reasonableness principle in Section 43 of the Criminal Code, which
grants partial immunity to parents, although "reasonableness" is a basic
principle in many legal systems and the courts always have to fill it with
content. It is true that Canadian law did set criteria for reasonableness,
but they did not always make it possible to reach uniformity in court
rulings and there were cases of beatings that were not slight where the
parents were acquitted. Maybe other criteria, in addition to those that
already exist, might succeed in dispersing the fog, accord a better sense
for the Canadian courts with interpretation of the law, and reach greater
uniformity in the outcome of the cases in question. One cannot ignore
the dissenting opinion in the 2004 judgment of the Canadian Supreme
Court. It is possible that this minority opinion will, as time passes,
become the majority opinion. It is very possible that this minority
opinion is paving the way for gradual legal, social, and public
recognition of the need for the prohibition of corporal punishment.
The moderate legal intervention model presents a correct balance of
interests, albeit theoretically. It attempts, and in some of the systems
presented here, even succeeds in retaining the principles of the integrity
and dignity of the family unit as an outcome of the family approach, but
does not neglect children's rights as an outcome of the individualistic
approach. There is some sort of considered balance between family
interests, public interests (lack of desire to intervene excessively in the
family unit and the desire to prevent the courts from being flooded with
claims), and private interests (the rights of the child as an individual in
society).
All of those legal systems also permit a certain freedom of action in
a multi-cultural society, such as American and Canadian societies. When
the deed of corporal punishment is not totally forbidden but only hedged,
it does not constitute a "declaration of war" on groups and sectors in
which it is common. It permits a respectable living space for those
groups so that they will not feel threatened and will not be forced to
abandon their traditional customs, but will only have to adjust to the
rules of reasonableness and moderation, an edict with which the public is
able to comply. This balance does not opt for the simple solution of a
prohibition on those parental conducts; it chooses to confront the daily
dilemmas in family life.
The situation can also be seen from another angle. One of the
explanations proposed for the legal situation in the United States is the lack
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of preparedness of society as a whole to accept a change in the form of a
prohibition on corporal punishment and lack of desire of the law to go
against these trends when it is not backed up by public support, while
emphasizing that this situation is changeable, should there be a change in
public opinion on the subject? 53 This point will be of great significance in
the review of some of the following models and of the desirable model. In
the next part, a legal system will be presented in which the law wanted to
make a pioneering breakthrough and uproot common norms that it viewed
as improper. In this, it did not allow for the perception of the approaching
upheaval by the public and its abilities to take on board the change of the
norm without legal and social factors cooperating and launching a
propaganda campaign to this end. In the United States and other countries,
the law did not want to wrestle with society and chose to wait and flow
with the social change. This is a serious difference in the legal-social
world outlook and in the attitude of the law to social changes. This
theoretical difference also resulted in a difference in the outcome of the
intervention.
Unlike the minimal intervention model, children are not the
property of their parents under the moderate legal intervention model.
The legal systems comprising the moderate intervention model try to find
a bridge between an individualistic approach and a family approach. The
declarative starting point of the model is, however, somewhat
problematic for our times because its point of view is overly paternalistic
and focuses on the obligations of the parent and the interest of the family
as a whole, while the rights of the child are expressed only in restriction
to those obligations. The moderate legal intervention model opts for the
proper balance but does not succeed in putting it into the correct
marketing package. Perhaps, with respect to the Canadian experience, it
can also be said that there is a gap between a theoretically successful
balance and its practical implementation. The implementation
difficulties mainly stem from fuzziness in interpretation of the
foundation of reasonableness in different circumstances.
This being the case, that basis of the balance set by the moderate
intervention model is a proper basis, but not in its original form. Changes
have to be made in it and, in particular, it has to be more attentive to
children's rights and to the damage that could be caused by corporal
punishment. In my opinion, one can reach a similar result through a
clearer declaration regarding children's rights and their ramifications, such
as emphasizing the damages that could be inflicted on a child through
corporal punishment. There is also room to determine more criteria and
parameters that will guide and instruct parents when and how they can
53. Warburg, supra note 25, at 57-60, 66.
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administer corporal punishment for their children's education and when
they would be exposed to an indictment.
General parameters of reasonableness, proportionality, and
moderation do not suffice because the public does not know what is
contained in those bases and the courts cannot reach uniformity in their
judgments on the subject. Canadian law, to a certain extent, took an
important step in setting criteria, but further criteria should be added. The
criteria have to ensure that those parental behaviors will be permitted only
in relatively rare instances and only when parents and educators meet an
arc of difficult restrictions and reservations.
Perhaps the solution is to ban, in one way or another, the use of
corporal punishment, leaving room for very narrow defenses. There are
several ways to enact such a ban. The next part of this Article presents a
strict model that banned corporal punishment in penal law. A unique
model that tries to create a civil human right for the child not to be
subjected to corporal punishment will be presented. After close summary
of those models, I will identify the most appropriate way to ban corporal
punishment, and conclude whether it is through penal or civil human rights
laws or if there is a need to create a new model.
C. The Strict-Penal Legal Intervention Model: Criminal Ban-Israeli
and Cypriot Law
The strict-penal legal intervention model intensively intrudes in
parent/child relationships, which is to a large extent an outcome of the
individualistic approach that makes allowances mainly for the rights of
the child. The intervention also occurs when the rights of the child are
applied at the expense of the whole family unit, which may, in the long
term be detrimental to the child. In practice, this model usually also
applies to the family unit the general law in effect between strangers,
often without allowance for the fact that the family territory is a special
unit in society that requires a different and more gentle attitude. In this
respect, the strict-penal model constitutes a second extreme to the
minimal legal intervention model.
The strict-penal legal intervention model will be demonstrated by
way of two legal systems that have adopted penal intervention, the most
sweeping form of legal intervention. Israeli law, which is relatively
young, has clearly switched to the model of strict-penal intervention.
The criminal prohibition imposed on corporal punishment by the Israeli
Supreme Court, as it will be seen below, also has ramifications for the
interpretation of earlier legislative measures on different judicial levels.
Details of the various implications for existing legislation will point to
the impact, which is often most problematic. Cypriot law has also
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prohibited corporal punishment through criminal law. Unlike Israel, this
prohibition was made in orderly legislation accompanied by a public
campaign to inculcate the norm. The importance of these differences
will be examined below.
Strict-penal intervention appears to resolve the problem of legal
intervention in parent/child relationships in that it deals with the issue from
the root. The model intervenes full force and realizes the rights of the
child, the weak organ in family and society, which is to a great extent at
the expense of the rights of the parent, the strong one. This intervention,
however, if made through a criminal judgment rather than through
legislation, could be destructive particularly for the family unit and even
for the child himself. It may also be assumed that those who follow the
furrow of strict-penal intervention did not take all the possible
ramifications of the outcome of the intervention into account.
Israeli law, which banned corporal punishment in a penal court
judgment that constitutes a binding precedent, will be examined first.
Israel is a common law country. The Supreme Court, whose rulings are
law, and therefore constitute binding precedent, has recently and clearly
eaten away at the right and authority of parents in favor of the rights of
children because it has almost totally forbidden the use of corporal
punishment of children. At first, corporal punishment was forbidden in
the educational system and later expanded to the framework of the
family unit. Thus, after almost fifty years, the legal situation addressing
corporal punishment changed following the 1953 decision of Rassi,54 a
criminal judgment that permitted the use of corporal punishment in the
family unit and, with certain reservations, in the educational system.
Arguing that it was a matter of lacuna, this ruling relied on English law 55
and was based, inter alia, on agency relationships between parent and
teacher, who is in loco parentis, for the purpose of the child's education.
The Supreme Court ruled that parents and educators may impose
physical punishments on their children in order to educate them in the
right way but such is to be done with great caution, for the sake of
education alone, and not for the satisfaction of any lust for revenge, in
accordance with the principles of proportionality and reasonableness as
distinct from acts of cruelty and abuse.
54. S. Ct. 7/53 Rassi v. Attorney General [1953] IsrSC 7(2) P.D. 790. For the
English version see http://elyon I.court.gov.il/files-eng/53/070/000/zO1/
53000070.z01.htm (last visited July 15, 2007).
55. The break from the English umbilical cord occurred with the enactment of the
Foundations of Justice Law 1980, S. H. 978, 163. According to this law, any issue for
which there is no explicit response in legislation, court rulings or by analogy, is to be
based on local, rather than English, sources. Id. Previously, in the case of a lacuna, it
had been necessary to turn, according to Section 46 of the King's Order in Council for
the Land of Israel 1922-1947, to English law.
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Rassi constitutes an example of moderate legal intervention, with
the law leaving parents with discretion whether to adopt corporal
punishment so long as it is reasonable and moderate, in a way similar to
the English and American law. Rassi constituted binding and guiding
penal case law for decades. Section 24(7) of the Torts Civil Wrongs
Ordinance in Israel sets forth a defense against a legal action for the civil
tort of battery for parents and teachers who used moderate and
reasonable force for the education of the child.
5 6
The beginning of the process that resulted in change can be found in
the amendments to legislation dealing with domestic violence both in the
criminal and civil contexts at the end of the 1980's and beginning of the
1990's. These changes directly impacted human rights, the rights of
children, and essentially, corporal punishment. Following an eruption of
serious cases of domestic violence and an understanding that it was the
family, of all places, which constituted a "hothouse" for dangerous
exploitation of minors, Amendment 26 of the Israeli Penal Law was
enacted in 1989. 57 This law is also known as the "Prevention of Abuse
of Minors and Helpless Persons Law" and deals with the offenses of
battery and abuse of minors and helpless persons, particularly by parents
or persons in charge of them. The Prevention of Domestic Violence Law
was enacted, as part of the civil family laws, in 1991. 58  Its great
importance lay in the determination of a mechanism of restraining orders
and protection orders against a violent element in the family even before
completion of the legal clarification of the family dispute and
irrespective thereof. The new legislation should be taken together with
the Legal Capacity and Guardianship Law, 59 which considers, inter alia,
parental obligations vis-A-vis children.
The most important document that substantially impacted human
rights in general, and amongst them children's rights in Israel in recent
years, is The Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, enacted in 1992.60
It is true that Israel has no constitution, but the Basic Law has obtained a
supreme status in Israeli law by according constitutional validity to basic
56. Torts Civil Wrongs Ordinance, 1944, Section 24(7).
57. The Penal Law (Amendment No. 26) 1989, S. H. 1290, 90.
58. The Prevention of Domestic Violence Law 1991, S. H. 1352, 138.
59. The Legal Capacity and Guardianship Law 1962, S. H. 380, 120 [hereinafter
Capacity Law].
60. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 1992, S.H. 1391 (there was an impact
from the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child); G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44th
Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989) (The Convention is known as CRC, Israel
signed and ratified the Convention in 1991.). The reference to Israel is in Convention
Documents 31, 22; see BITENSKY, supra note 13 (discussing the influence of that
Convention on children's rights).
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human rights. 61 This law constitutes a prime source in the development
of the strict-penal intervention model, as reflected in Israeli law in the
matter of corporal punishment. The purpose of the Basic Law is to
protect not only a person's body but also his dignity, and to prevent
humiliation, which is in accordance with the purpose stated in Section la
of the Law to prevent harm to the values of the State of Israel as a
democratic Jewish state. Section 2 states, "[t]here shall be no violation
of the life, body or dignity of any person as such,, 62 while Section 4
provides, "[a]ll persons are entitled to protection of their life, body and
dignity."
63
Actually, human rights were not strangers to Israeli law prior to the
Basic Law;64 however, the legislation made dignity of man and protection
of his body a protected basic right with a higher normative level than that
of a "regular" law or court judgment. 65 The dignity the child obtains, in
this context, is a special status since the law's litmus test could be the
degree to which it extends its protection over the weak in society.
Professor Aharon Barak, then a Justice of the Supreme Court, noted in an
article that, at the center of the Basic Law, stands each person, adult and
66
minor. Supreme Court Justice Mishael Cheshin notes, "someone who is
small is a person, albeit a person small in dimensions but a small person is
also entitled to all the rights of a large person., 67  These and similar
statements have been oft-quoted in court judgments and in Israeli literature
on the matter of corporal punishment.
In the years following the enactment of the Basic Law, murmurings
began to be expressed in the legal literature over the legitimacy of
corporal punishment, even if it is moderate and reasonable. 68 At the
61. Together with the other Basic Laws, the common Israeli law in effect has
established a sort of constitution.
62. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, supra note 60, § 2.
63. Id., § 4.
64. Meir Shamgar, Human Dignity and Violence, 3 MISHAPT UMIMSHAL 33, 39
(1995-6). The Declaration of Independence is based on freedom, justice and peace as
envisaged by the prophets of Israel and it calls for equality of social and political rights.
The Supreme Court formulated the various basic rights over the years. The Basic Laws
did not create them ex nihilo but brought them together in statutory provisions while
determining arrangements for their incidence and protection.
65. See C. A. 6821/93, Permission for C. A. 1908/94, Permission for C. A. 3363/94
United Mizrachi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Cooperative Village, 49(4) P.D. 221 (1995), paras.
55-56.
66. AHARON BARAK, Protected Human Rights and the Individual Law, in
KLINGHOFFER BOOK ON PUBLIC LAW 163, 165-6 (ed. Yitzchak Zamir, 1993); AHARON
BARAK, INTERPRETATION IN LAW-CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 435 (Vol. C, 1994).
67. CA 6106/92 Anon. v. the Attorney-General, Tak-EI 94(2) 1166 (1994).
68. See, Haim Cohen, Values of a Jewish and Democratic State-Studies in the
Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 9 HAPRAKLIT, 30-31 (1994); SHULAMIT ALMOG,
RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 61 (1997).
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same time, there were expressions in court judgments regarding the
importance of parental rights to educate their children as a basic
constitutional right, which is also and primarily the right of children to be
educated by their parents. In this context, the President of the Supreme
Court, Meir Shamgar, stated in a case about an argument between
parents as to how to educate children, but did not involve the use of
violence, there is a need for limited state intervention while retaining
familial family privacy and an autonomous upbringing and education of
the children. The state intervention should be by way of an exception
with a reason to justify it, such as cases where there is a need to protect
the child when the parents are not fulfilling their role properly. Simply
stated "the right of the parents (to educate the child) is relative and is
limited by the rights and interest of the child., 69 These words have also
been quoted repeatedly. Is the right to educate to be restricted in cases of
reasonable and moderate corporal punishment?
The process started with a ban on corporal punishment in the
educational system in a number of judgments by the Supreme Court,
relying, inter alia, on The Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.7 °
Most of these judgments were made at the height of a bitter dispute in the
69. CA 2266/93 Anon. v. Anon, 49(1) IsrSC 221, 231, 237-9 (1993).
70. CrimA 4405/94 State of Israel v. Elgani, 48(5) IsrSC 191 (1994) (stating that
physical violence vis-A-vis a pupil is forbidden. The body and spirit of a pupil are not
ownerless and the child's human dignity is hurt if the teachers use physical violence against
him/her. Ear-pulling is not a permissible means for encouraging a pupil's memory and
hitting the hand with a ruler is not a permissible cautionary measure. The judgment did not
revoke the Rassi ruling and did not determine that it was obsolete even with respect to the
educational system. The court also rejected an argument that was raised during the case,
according to which these disciplinary measures are acceptable in the Arab sector); CrimA
5224/97, State of Israel v. Sde-Or, 54(3) IsrSC 572 (3) 374 (1998) (stating that all forms of
corporal punishment by teachers, kindergarten teachers and educators are forbidden. The
Court ruled the Rassi judgment was no longer befitting for the currently accepted norms,
and in our times any use of force by educators, even for educational purposes, is forbidden,
particularly vis-A-vis younger children. Corporal punishment could achieve the opposite of
what was hoped for when the educating figure, serving as a model for emulation, itself
adopts violent measures. In this respect, no importance is attributed to the gravity of the
corporal punishment used against a child. An erroneous outlook in this context jeopardizes
the welfare of the children and could prejudice the basic values of Israeli society, human
dignity, and bodily integrity. The Rassi judgment has, therefore, now been revoked
regarding the educational system). The Supreme Court has also ruled, in a number of
judgments in appeals on decisions of the Civil Service Disciplinary Court in the matter of
teachers who hit students between the years 2000 and 2002, that it is seriously prohibited to
hit pupils for the purposes of education and in any sector. In one of the decisions there was
an argument that corporal punishment was acceptable in the Arab sector in Israel. It was
ruled that such a teacher should be seriously punished by disciplinary law in accordance
with the sanctions featured in the relevant legislation: reprimand, a fine and even dismissal.
CA 1730/00 Anon. v. Israel 54(5) IsrSC 433, 437-8 (2000); CA 4503/00 Amin v. Israel, IsrSC
2000(3). 1296 (2000); CA 1682/02 Abed Al-Wahab v. Israel, Tak-El 2002(2) 1300 (2002);
Civil Service Appeal 3362/02 State of Israel v. Abu Asbah, 56(5) P.D. 6 (2002)).
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lower courts over the validity of the Rassi judgment and the question of
the legitimacy of corporal punishment in the family unit.7' However, this
legal situation did not stay in place for long once the Supreme Court
spoke.
In January 2000, a judgment was given in Plonit.72  This case
involved a mother accused of frequently hitting her two small children
on various occasions and on different parts of their bodies with various
objects and, in effect, turning them into her servants or slaves. The
children were harshly beaten by her when they did not do her bidding.73
The mother admitted some of the acts, did not express regret over them,
and claimed that although she adopted an educational path which
differed from what was usual, this was done for the sake of educating the
children to be obedient and disciplined.74 In the appeal, written by
Justice Dorit Beinish with which the President, Aharon Barak, concurred,
the majority opined that the acts fell into the category of battery and
physical abuse.75 The court sentenced the mother to a period of
probation and a suspended prison sentence,76  but not actual
imprisonment.77
In the opinion, Justice Beinish went into greater detail and
71. The Rassi judgment has remained since the beginning of the 1950's, and for
decades was the binding judgment in anything dealing with corporal punishment by parents
on the penal level (there was a similar defense, as noted, in torts). See Cr.F. (Dct. Ct. T.A.)
570/91, State of Israel v. Asulin, 52(1) P.M. 431 (During the 1990's, two seemingly quite
contrary approaches developed in the District Courts and Magistrate Courts in Israel: one
supporting moderate and reasonable corporal punishment, and the other prohibiting corporal
punishment totally and uncompromisingly, even if moderate and reasonable represents a
model of the strict-penal intervention which is currently discussed.); see Cr. F. (TA) 511/95
State of Israel v. Anon., Tak-Meh 97(3) 1898 (1997). State of Isreal v. Asulin relied on the
Rassi judgment as binding case law of the Supreme Court as an expression of the family
approach, while State of Israel v. Anon relied on a number of theories. One being, a
declaration of the non-validity of the Rassi judgment since it does not fit the prevailing
social and legal situation following the passing of the UN Convention on the Rights of the
Child, the Basic Law and the changes in children's rights generally, as an expression for the
individualistic approach. Both these contrary approaches in the lower courts led to an
interesting legal situation, which the verdict in a case where a parent hit his child
moderately and reasonably for his/her education would be decided according to the judge
sitting on the case and his/her adoption of one or other of the approaches.
72. CrimA 4596/98 Plonit v. Israel, [2000] IsrSC 54(1) P.D. 145. English version
available at http://elyon1.court.gov.il/files-eng/98/960/045/nO2/98045960.nO2.htm (last
visited July 15, 2007).
73. Id., para. 18 (Beinish, J).
74. Id., para. 4 (Beinish, J).
75. Id., para. 18-9 (Beinish, J).
76. Plonit v. Israel, [2000] IsrSC 54(1) P.D. 145, para. 32 (Beinish, J.), para. 25
(Englard, J).
77. In Justice Yizhak Englard's opinion agreeing with the punishment, the same
outcome could also have been reached following a conviction for the offense of battery
alone since the deeds described do not constitute an offense of abuse. Id.
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considered the mother's argument that, her deeds were not to the point of
a criminal offense since they were, by way of corporal punishment, a
means of discipline for the education of the children and improvement of
their ways. After taking the changes in children's rights into
consideration and making an extensive comparison with various legal
systems such as Canada, England and some of the United States
jurisdictions that support reasonable and moderate corporal punishment,
Justice Beinish concluded that corporal punishment of children as a
method of education is unacceptable on all counts and is remnant of a
socio-educational perception that is obsolete and "forbidden in our
society today." In making this conclusion, Justice Beinish, also relied on
legal sources such as the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and
The Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, as well as additional legal
systems, such as Scandinavia, that prohibit the use of corporal
punishment. This reliance on Scandinavian law is by no means accurate,
since the law in these countries developed a substantially different
arrangement than that arrived at by Justice Beinish.
At the end of the opinion, Justice Beinish to a certain extent restricted
the sweeping judgment she passed not long before expressing limitations
recognized in criminal liability such as the de minimis defense and
prosecutorial discretion. This expresses a fitting distinction between the
use of force by parents for purposes of educational punishment, which is
unacceptable and forbidden, and "reasonable use of force to prevent injury
to the child or to others," or light, if firm, contact with the body of the child
in order "to preserve order.'' 78 What is "light, if firm, contact?" It is not
stated in the judgment and so it is difficult to differentiate between light,
reasonable and moderate corporal punishment, which is currently
forbidden by a strict-penal prohibition, and light, if firm, contact which is
permissible. It may be assumed that the intention of this statement, for
example, is a license to address a child with force when he objects, to hold
him firmly so that he will clean up a mess he has made, prevent him from
wandering off to a dangerous place, or to forcibly take from him a
dangerous appliance or toy he took from his sibling. Perhaps it is a sort of
restraining "hold" for a child who misbehaves and is unruly, which allows
his whole body to be embraced or his hand or foot be firmly held, forcibly
but without causing pain. This method allows for a sort of bear hug that is
intended to be warm and loving, if firm, restraining his unruliness and
stopping him from doing whatever he was doing, even for a long time.79
78. Plonit v. Israel, [2000] IsrSC 54(1) P.D. 145, para. 30.
79. Ezer views this as, for example, preventing the child from running into the street.
Ezer, supra note 16, at 139, note 4.
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Others view this, in effect, as an incidence of the defense of necessity; 8°
although, as I see it, this is a difficult interpretation because the judge
could have referred explicitly to this defense when she mentioned the de
minimis defense.
The question of whether moderate and reasonable corporal
punishment needs to be discussed at length, where the case in hand
concerns serious violence and cruelty that (in the majority opinion in this
case) reached the proportions of abuse was already raised above. One
possible response could be the very reference to the mother's defense
argument, stating that her punishment was the way she educated her
children, even if it was different from what is accepted. Justice Beinish
also attempted to justify her discussion of light corporal punishment on
the slippery slope principle, by virtue of which a certain deed is
forbidden, restricted or related to with severity that, objectively, is not
prohibited per se. Meaning that the law forbids an act, only out of
concern that it overflows to the point of becoming a more severe and
serious action. The judge argued that the damage that corporal
punishment causes, even if slight, could be great and there is a fear that it
could deteriorate with time into serious violence and even abuse.81 Since
a light blow often does not help, the temptation to increase the punitive
dosage is great, and the parent feels that in order to convey the
educational message, the force of the punishment has to be increased.
8 2
According to this argument, when the barrier is removed and the restraint
is released, it is very difficult to return later to a moderate level and the
road to systematic abuse could be short. Accordingly, one may not rely
on the discretion of the parent, and the integrity of the body and soul of
the minor should not be prejudiced by any corporal punishment
whatsoever. In Justice Beinish's opinion, this principle prevails even
over the concern that such a ruling will be an edict with which the public
is unable to comply.
Through her comments, Justice Beinish also supports the requirement
of examining the legitimacy of the methods of education in accordance
with changes in societal values. In her opinion, attitudes that were correct
at the time of the Rassi judgment have changed and are no longer relevant.
Nowadays, the use of corporal punishment as a way of education is
outdated. The source of this argument is not clear. Are the Israeli and
80. LESLIE SEBBA, He Who Spares the Rod' in the Interpretation of the Court:
Thoughts Following a Legal Revolution, in TRENDS IN CRIMINOLOGY: THEORY, POLICY
AND APPLICATION, IN HONOR OF DR. MENACHEM HOROWITZ ON His EIGHTIETH BIRTHDAY
425, 443 (Meir Hovav, Leslie Sebba & Menachem Amir, eds., 2003).
81. Plonit v. Israel, [2000] IsrSC 54(1) P.D. 145, para. 30.
82. Guidance for Effective Discipline, supra note 2 ;BEATING THE DEVIL, supra note
1, at 85.
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non-Israeli public, its judges and scholars, really of the opinion that there is
no longer a place for such a method of education and that it should be
thoroughly condemned? That this was the situation is most doubtful,
mainly in view of some schools that continued to make their presence felt
into the end of the 1990's, and in light of the legal systems in many
countries where moderate and reasonable corporal punishment is still
permissible. Also representing the ongoing life of corporal punishment is
the view in social science disciplines of the familial approach, which still
exists. Thus, Justice Beinish, in effect, revokes the Rassi judgment in all
matters dealing with the family. The Plonit decision is the binding ruling
in Israel today on the issue of corporal punishment in the family unit. The
lower courts are bound by this judgment of the Supreme Court, which is
binding on every court except the Supreme Court itself 83
Israel is a multi-cultural country, with various ethnic communities,
religions and nationalities, and also many immigrants coming from
different countries over the years. A frequent argument in such a society
is that the method of education with which the parent is familiar and
which he knows, in accordance with his religious, communal or ethnic
ascription, or which he has chosen from an ideological point of view, is
different from that which is generally accepted in society. Therefore, the
argument provides that, society and the law must allow the parent space
to keep those norms to which he is accustomed, even if the educational
method includes the use of force toward children. The strict-penal legal
intervention model, following the individualistic approach, would appear
to see itself as having a clear function to set norms that are consistent
with the rights of the child and try to impose them within those sectors,
with a clear statement that the norm has to be egalitarian within all
groups of the population and has to be enforced equally on these groups.
The guideline judgment, Plonit, on the issue was not given on a
specifically multi-cultural background, but the judgment combines with a
general determination in which the act is not subjective and is not looked
at from the point of view of the victim, the attacker, or from the aspect of
the sector to which they belong or their country of origin, but is gauged
objectively as seen by an observer on the side.
No prohibition of corporal punishment has been enacted into Israeli
legislation in the meantime. However, this process has continued. In
2000, the legislature canceled the defense against the civil tort of battery
in the Tort Ordinance, which was used by parents and teachers who
inflicted reasonable and moderate corporal punishment on children.84
83. Basic Law, supra note 60, § 20.
84. Section 24(7) of the Civil Wrongs Ordinance was revoked in Amendment
Number 9 of the Tort Ordinance. Tort Ordinance, 2000, S.H. 1742, 213.
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Toward the latter part of 2000, the Pupils' Rights Law was passed in the
Knesset.85 Section 10 of the Pupils' Rights Law, determined that the
rights of the pupil were not to be punished corporally or in a humiliating
way inasmuch as it is inconsistent with human dignity. This situation
results in almost complete harmony between criminal and tort law.
The prohibition on corporal punishment in the judgment also has
extensive ramifications for the law that existed prior to the prohibition
ruling and its interpretation. As noted, at the end of the 1980's and
beginning of the 1990's, a string of laws and amendments to laws passed
with the purpose of strengthening the defense of the rights of the weak
members in a family and in society, who are first and foremost, children.
The importance of these. laws is very great but their main purpose is to
deal with serious violence and abuse. This creates a danger if they are
also to be applied to light corporal punishment. The result could be an
excessively sweeping result causing serious harm to the whole family,
including the child himself. There is no avoiding the thought that the
sweeping judgment in Plonit did not take into account all the possible
ramifications of the results of the prohibition at all these levels.
Following are a number of examples.
There is a view that, since corporal punishment necessarily causes a
psychological injury, it is considered to be injury causing battery.16 This
serious offense made by a parent or caretaker brings extended liability,
i.e. the punishment of seven years' imprisonment, 87 as opposed to four
years for regular battery. 88 In addition, this offense imposes a mandated
reporting on every citizen alongside an increased duty on a person in
charge of a minor and on various professionals who come into contact
with the child to report to the authorities, a welfare official or the police,
a list of offenses perpetrated on a minor.89 This interpretation seems far-
reaching, tendentious, and forced, particularly in view of the dispute in
the professional literature regarding the damages, if any, that corporal
punishment causes to a child. Indeed, there are those who hold that any
corporal punishment, even slight and one-time, could cause various
physical 9° and psychological-behavioral 9' damage to a child. Others;
85. Pupils' Rights Law, 2000, S. H. 1761, 42.
86. The Report of the Committee for Examination of Basic Principles in the field of
Children and Legislation, § 5.3.2, p. 100, available at http://www.justice.gov.i/MOJ/
Heb/HavaadLeZhuyot/. An injury is defined as being either psychological or physical, in
accordance with Section 368b(c) of the Penal Law, 1977, S. H. 864, 226.
87. Penal Law, supra note 86, at Section 368b(a).
88. Id. at §§ 379, 383(b).
89. Id. at Section 368d (providing that mandated reporting applies to a string of
offenses, among them: abandonment or neglect; battery causing real injury; battery
causing serious injury; and, abuse).
90. See Newell, supra note 16, at 224-25; Orentlicher, supra note 16, at 155-60; ALICE
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however, point to the fact that light and moderate corporal punishment
used intelligently and not systematically does not always harm the body
and soul of a child and, even if minor damage is caused, it is voided and
rejected because of the efficacy of the punishment for the education of
the child in the short and long term.92
Such an interpretation removes all content from the offense of non-
injurious battery of a child by a parent since, according to this
interpretation, any battery of a child is one that causes injury. Hence,
according to this interpretation, any corporal punishment exposes the
parent to a punishment of up to seven years' imprisonment and binds the
general public as well as those caring for the child and in charge of him
(for example, the other parent who did not hit the child) to report every
instance of corporal punishment, however minor, to the authorities. To
this must be added temporary remedies such as detention of the punitive
parent at the criminal level, and his removal from the home by a
restraining order, which is possible at both criminal and civil levels93 and
can be applied now also vis-d-vis light corporal punishment.
How enticing it can be to report to the police violence of a spouse
MILLER, FOR YOUR OwN GOOD: HIDDEN CRUELTY IN CHILD REARING AND THE ROOTS OF
VIOLENCE 7, 61, 65-6, 115-16, 232 (Hildegarde Hannum & Hunter Hannum trans., 1990);
Warburg, supra note 25, at 58.
91. See Elizabeth Thompson Gershoff, Corporal Punishment by Parents and
Associated Child Behaviors and Experiences: A Meta-Analytic and Theoretical Review,
128 PSYCHOL. BULL. 539-79 (2002); BEATING THE DEVIL, supra note 1, at 119-20;
PHILLIP GREVEN, SPARE THE CHILD: THE RELIGIOUS ROOTS OF PUNISHMENT AND THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPACT OF PHYSICAL ABUSE 193-8 (1990); Johnson, supra note 25.
92. A string of research on this issue was published in the journal of Pediatrics, one
of whose 1996 issues was devoted entirely to the subject, Issue 98(4) of October 1996,
following a conference of the Health Academy in February 1996, which corporal
punishment does not fall into the category of abuse was examined. From the research, it
follows that there is equality between the rival approaches on the efficacy of corporal
punishment and there are those who claim that one can even point to greater efficacy of
this method as against its alternatives. See Baumrind's articles, supra note 52; Marjorie
Lindner Gunnoe & Carrie Lea Mariner, Toward a Developmental-Contextual Model of
the Effects of Parental Spanking on Children's Aggression, 151 ARCHIVE OF PEDIATRICS
AND ADOLESCENT MEDICINE 768 (1997). Larzelere's conclusion, which he filtered out
from much such scientific research not differentiating between mild and severe corporal
punishment analyzing thirty-five studies on the issue, was that light corporal punishment
is not harmful and can even be of benefit. Robert E. Larzelere, Presentation: A Review of
the Outcomes of Parental Use of Nonabusive or Customary Physical Punishment, 98
PEDIATRICS 824 (1996). See also Orentlicher, supra note 16, at 159.
93. The distancing of a violent parent from the home is possible in Israel in a number
of ways: as part of an alternative detention in criminal law and condition for release on bail,
in the framework of the power of the Court for Family Affairs in the context of a claim for
alimony, for quiet accommodations, and by virtue of civil law. Prevention of Violence in
the Family Law, supra note 58, which accords the Magistrate Courts and the Courts for
Family Affairs as well as the religious court extensive (parallel) powers to adopt a
restraining order.
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against a child, apparently in the name of good citizenship, when
underlying it is an exaggeration or fabrication of a story out of a wish to
achieve an advantage in divorce and custody disputes. How tempting can
it be to file a petition ex parte for restraining a violent spouse out of
concern, as it were, for the interests of the children? Are these outcomes
not overly difficult as forms of legal intervention when it is a matter of
light corporal punishment intended for educational purposes, and not
violence for its own sake? The whole legitimacy underlying corporal
punishment as a method of education, for those opinions that view
legitimacy in it, rests on its being light, moderate and reasonable,
measured and calculated, not frequent and not recurrent. A light slap
broadcasts to the child in a symbolic way that he behaved improperly and
it is not intended for relief of the anger and frustration of the parent that
their child is disobedient. Even for those approaches that are not satisfied
by the use of corporal punishment and are interested in seeing a legal
prohibition on this conduct, particularly on the criminal level, these
ramifications could be most difficult. Indeed, a number of Israeli judges in
the District Courts have criticized the functioning of the enforcement
authorities, mainly the police and prosecutors, for applying the law in an
overly pedantic way, which seriously harmed the family unit in those
cases.
94
What about the proceedings after the indictment? Here, too, there is
no small problem. Can the defenses and barriers existing in the law
prevent the mass filing of charges against parents who physically punished
their children in a light, reasonable and moderate way after the Plonit
case? As noted by Justice Beinish, there is no fear of this because of the
existence of general defenses in the Penal law, such as de minimis,95 and
vis-A-vis a relatively new defense that the judge creates only for a situation
involving parents and children-"light but firm contact to maintain
order.
9 6
Justice Beinish also calls for reliance on the discretion of the
prosecution not topress charges in the absence of any public interest.97 In
her opinion, these reservations on criminal liability express a fitting
distinction between the use of force by parents for unacceptable and
prohibited purposes and the reasonable use of force intended to prevent
94. See State of Israel v. Asulin, 52(1) P.M. 431; Cr. F. (TA) 335/96 State of Israel v.
Anon., unpublished; Cr. F. (TA) 336/95 State of Israel v. Anon., unpublished); Cr. F.
(TA) 288/96 State of Israel v. Anon., Tak-Meh 97(2) 121 (1997); Cr. F. (TA) 40221/00
State of Israel v. Anon., unpublished; Cr. F. (TA) 40076/00 State of Israel v. Ploni and
Plonit, Tak-Mech (2000)(2) 9120 (2000).
95. Penal Law, supra note 86, § 34(17).
96. Plonit v. Israel, [2000] IsrSC 54(1) P.D. 145, para. 30.
97. Id.
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harm to the child himself or to others, or to maintain order.98 According to
Justice Beinish, there are sufficient and proper filters through which no
criminal liability will be imposed on a parent in instances of little value
that do not justify enforcement in the framework of the penal laws. This,
however, is surprising in view of her extensive explanation about corporal
punishment being harmful to the child and the importance of prohibiting it,
even where it is a matter of a light punishment.
Can the de minimis defense be used in a case of light corporal
punishment? In my opinion, it is difficult to see such a result after the
unequivocal judgment in the Plonit case and the statement that no
corporal punishment is permissible. If light, moderate and reasonable
corporal punishment nevertheless fits into the de minimis defense, then
there is an internal contradiction in the Plonit judgment, because all
corporal punishment is forbidden. Hence, the only way that this defense
could be upheld would be in those cases of light but firm contact with the
body of the child for the sake of retaining order, although Justice Beinish
certainly referred to two different defenses. Moreover, as noted above,
the boundaries of those cases of "light but firm contact" are altogether
unclear from what she says. The defense is fuzzy and its application,
therefore, problematic. Apparently, there is no alternative but to
construe the two defenses that have arisen here as a matter of the amount
of the force used and its proportionality, reasonableness, and nothing
more than that, although such was not Justice.Beinish's purpose. 99 Such
an interpretation will, of course, remove the ground from under the
sweeping renewal of the Plonit judgment.
Justice Beinish also recognized prosecutorial discretion as a
defense. Such defense places the onus on the prosecutorial authorities
not to take to trial cases of light corporal punishment. With all due
respect, this is not a defense because it refers to a process preceding the
pressing of charges. In view of the forceful determinations in the Plonit
case, it is not clear to what extent the prosecutorial authorities will decide
not to press charges in cases of light corporal punishment. That is to say,
in a situation in which case law explicitly determines that light corporal
punishment is an outmoded educational method and is nowadays
prohibited, with a clear statement that this also includes light corporal
punishment, one should not be surprised if the main points of the Plonit
judgment are literally internalized by the prosecutorial authorities. This
possibility, together with the element of an edict with which the public is
unable to comply, will result in a change of the status quo and a mass
pressing of charges with respect to corporal punishment. It may be noted
98. Id.
99. Cf SEBBA, supra note 80, at 452-53.
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that some criticize the very granting of such extensive discretion to the
prosecutorial authorities.'00
The true test of the Plonit judgment could actually be whether the
prosecution and enforcement authorities and the Courts relate, in light of
the new situation, to a parent who inflicted light, moderate and
reasonable corporal punishment on their child. Pressing charges,
particularly after use of temporary remedies, could destroy the family. It
would not be justified to do so following light and infrequent corporal
punishment and we have seen that in this respect one cannot always rely
on the prosecution and enforcement authorities. For example, police
officers are beginning to internalize the prohibition, and the question is
what will this internalization lead to,' because, with all due respect, it
will not always be possible to rely on the courts to stop the snowball
effect. It is true that then Attorney-General, Edna Arbel, currently a
Justice in the Israeli Supreme Court, stated in a press interview that the
prosecution should examine each case on its merits according to its
circumstances and that steps should not be taken in every case against a
parent who used corporal punishment on their child for educational
purposes. 0 2 Nonetheless, as far as is known, there is no such thing as a
written directive for prosecutors and, as mentioned, the Attorney-General
has since been replaced. It should be admitted that, to the drawing of
these lines, it is difficult to see in practice that many charges are
meanwhile being pressed in Israel against parents in cases that are not
abusive and where no injury is inflicted. 0 3 But this should be looked at
over a broader perspective of time. In any event, it might be problematic
and change from time to time, and I think it is not proper for this
sensitive matter to be dependent on each prosecutor's discretion.
The deterrent is, of course, important, but sometimes the courts have
to intervene in a non-sweeping manner, specifically because of the delicate
and frail fabric of intra-familial relationships. A punishment for one
member of the family, however justified, could also hurt the other
members of the family and cast a question mark over its continued
survival. The integrity of the family unit has to be a common interest of all
parties-the hitting parent, the parent who did not hit, the child-victim, the
prosecuting authorities, the therapeutic bodies, and the legal system.
Plonit could have ramifications in directions other than that desired in this
context. The desire to protect minors and the helpless is also very much
100. Rhona Schuz, Three Years On : An Analysis of the Delegalisation of Physical
Punishment of Children by the Israeli Courts, 11 INT. J. OF CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 235, 244-
5 (2003) [hereinafter Schuz 2003].
101. Ezer, supra note 16, at 187.
102. Tova Tzimuki, No Hands, YEDI'OT AHARONOT, October 30, 1996, p.1.
103. See Schuz 2003, supra note 100, at 246, 248; SEBBA, supra note 80, at 453-54.
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understood and is at the basis of court judgments. The question, therefore,
is not whether corporal punishment should be prohibited but, namely, what
would be the most effective way from all points of view?
Let it be well noted that I do not want to say that the legislation is not
good or that the judgment in Plonit was unbecoming. The law often
constitutes the only channel for children who are exposed to violence, in
many cases within the four walls of their home, where there is no one to
hear and rescue them. But I do want to say that an overly literal
application of these implications on cases of light, moderate and
reasonable corporal punishment could bring about the extermination of the
family unit. It should be understood that the Plonit judgment does not
stand in a vacuum, but that it also has direct ramifications for the
legislation which was enacted before it. This does not seem to have been
the intention of those who drafted that legislation or of the public and
society in general. The strict criminal handling should be left for the hard
cases.
Apparently, a good solution would be to qualify the sweeping
judgment so that, in instances of light corporal punishment, the family will
not be exposed to such sweeping intervention on those aspects that were
discussed. But that would not suffice. As noted, the prohibition was
obtained in a court judgment. It is true that the transition, as we have seen,
was not sudden and its roots were in previous case law with respect to the
educational system. These judgments, however, found no public echo, as
did the Plonit judgment, and so the judgment in this case was perceived as
rapid and too sudden a transition from a "license" to a prohibition. It
would be an understatement to say that I am not convinced that the Israeli
courts have succeeded in readying the people for a transition to an almost
absolute prohibition on corporal punishment in the family unit, and the
issue is still far from being the subject of a social and legal consensus. The
prohibition was received as a "bolt of lightning" and led to a most alert
legal and social debate. The discussion of this case did not take
sufficiently into account, in my opinion, the question of preparing the
public mind to accept the prohibition of corporal punishment as an
educational method. It remains to be seen whether such a judgment is a
result of social policy and reflects public opinion pressing to find a
solution, or a solution differing from what exists, or whether the judgment
is a pioneering vanguard formulating social policy and influencing public
opinion in order to prepare minds for the anticipated change, and so
creating a new norm? I believe that there is no unequivocal answer to this
weighty question.
In Plonit, it is clear that, despite the statements that corporal
punishment as a means of education is outdated, the objective of the
Court was to be a vanguard and to set norms. These norms might have
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been before their time and the public might not have been ready for the
change. It is possible that a different path could have been taken and the
norms changed gradually and not in one fast stage, through statements
such as "by the way" in judgments and perhaps in external ways, such as
statements in the literature or in lectures, etc. 10 4 The Court also could
have tried to influence the legislature to change the legal situation, as it
has done and is doing in many other cases, rather than do so itself. A
change made in legislation is the subject of a wider consensus and can
better prepare the public. 10 5 The processes of legislation are lengthy and
an opportunity is given during them for various social and political
factors to express their opinion and have some influence, which is unlike
a sudden judicial decision. The extensive public controversy over the
question of the legitimacy of corporal punishment that arose following
Plonit proves matters did not penetrate the public consciousness and
perhaps not even that of jurists. In spite of the public controversy, the
judgment was received in wide public circles with surprise and even
anger.10
6
It is to be noted that, after the judgment, no educational publicity
campaign was conducted to inculcate the norm as was done in other
countries and such will be presented below. The body that undertook the
informational function was the Israel National Council for the Child
(NCC) which conducted an extensive campaign against corporal
punishment even before the judgment0 7 and published a special
explanatory booklet for the general public about the significance and
importance of the new situation and the alternatives to beatings. 10 8 The
NCC tried to promote the enactment of a law on the subject, since it was
not satisfied with only a court ruling. 10 9 However, the NCC is not a
governmental body and its budget is limited. Its influence is relatively
great, but perhaps less than that of a government ministry, which can and
104. Cf. SEBBA, supra note 80.
105. RHONA SCHUZ, Child Protection in the Israeli Supreme Court: Tortious
Parenting, Physical Punishment and Criminal Child Abuse, in THE INTERNATIONAL
SURVEY OF FAMILY LAW 2001 EDITION 165, 177-86 (Andrew Bainham ed., 2001)
[hereinafter ScHUz 2001]; Schuz 2003, supra note 100, at 242.
106. See Ezer, supra note 16, at 184-211 (describing some of the opinions within the
public and of experts following the judgment).
107. See NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR THE CHILD, EDUCATION IN VIOLENCE-EDUCATION
TO VIOLENCE, CORPORAL PUNISHMENT AND THE HITTING OF CHILDREN, A COLLECTION OF
ARTICLES PUBLISHED BY THE NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR THE CHILD (1993); NATIONAL
COUNCIL FOR THE CHILD, ABUSE OF CHILDREN IN ISRAEL 45-46 (1996).
108. WITH CHILDREN WITHOUT HITTING: SAYING No To CORPORAL PUNISHMENT
(Tamar Peled-Amir & Yitzhak Kadman eds., 2001); see also EDUCATION WITHOUT
VIOLENCE, A GUIDE FOR PARENTS (Yitzhak Kadman & Miriam Gilat eds., 6th ed., 2000).
109. Anat Tzigelman, The Council for the Child: The Next Stage-Legislation,
HAARETZ, Jan. 26, 2000.
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should have done this in its stead.' 10 The Committee for the Promotion
of Children's Rights in Legislation recommended, inter alia, holding
such a campaign under governmental sponsorship.' This
recommendation has yet to be implemented.
A ruling that is not the subject of consensus and is before its time,
could cause a number of interrelated problems. Advocate Yehudit Karp,
the former Deputy Attorney General in Israel,' 1 2 defended the results of the
judgment in Plonit although, some years earlier she pointed to problems
with the case. According to Karp, before the imposition of a penal
prohibition on corporal punishment at the hands of parents and educators,
it was apt to find a balance between the harm that could be done to the
child and society by light corporal punishment and the social damage that
could result from such a prohibition turning most parents into a population
of offenders. Karp was troubled by the possibility of increasing
intervention of enforcement authorities in family autonomy, a larger
intervention than society could abide by. Advocate Karp was also
concerned that, should a social position be declared, determining a
prohibition without any serious intention of enforcing it, in the final resort
the law would be disrespected and ineffective.11 3  Even the Director-
General of the Israel National Council for the Child, Dr. Yitzchak
Kadman, expressed a position a very short time before the judgment,
according to which there is no place for a legal prohibition on corporal
punishment as the public in Israel is not yet ready for such prohibition.
14
Similarly, Advocate Tamar Morag, then the legal advisor and the Director
of The Child and the Law Center of the NCC (and now a Professor of
Law) held, only about a year before the judgment in Plonit, that the debate
in Israel on the matter of corporal punishment was still at its beginning and
the path to legislation that would prohibit corporal punishment was "still
long."'1 15 According to Tamar, an extensive information campaign was
necessary to describe the damages inherent in corporal punishment and it
could be hoped that such information would result in a social change in
110. Cf Ezer, supra note 16, at 186; Binyamin Shmueli Good News for the Children
of Greece available at http://www.nfc.co.ilUArchive/003-D- 19195-00.html?tag=19-40-57
(last visited July 15, 2007) (discussing corporal punishment following the new
prohibition passed in Greece towards the end of 2006).
11I. Report of the Committee for Examination of Basic Principles in the field of
Children and Legislation, supra note 86.
112. Karp was also a member of the UN Committee for the Rights of the Child which
was appointed by virtue of Article 43 of the Convention.
113. YEHUDIT KARP, Corporal Punishment: A Legal Aspect, in EDUCATION IN
VIOLENCE-EDUCATION TO VIOLENCE, CORPORAL PUNISHMENT AND THE HITrING OF
CHILDREN, 4, 8-9 (National Council for the Child 1993).
114. It was said during at a meeting of the sub-committee of the Constitution, Law
and Justice Committee of the Knesset, May 23, 1999, p. 17 of the protocol.
115. Id.
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attitudes enabling re-examination of the law.' 16
Three main problems can be pointed out in this regard: (1) a
dispute could be generated in the public as to the legitimacy of the
decision and the authority of the Court to intervene and rule as it did, and
the judge could be perceived as involving personal attitudes, such as
social, value, religious, and even political attitudes in his judgment;
(2) judicial legislation is problematic, particularly when it is expected,
with a high degree of probability, that the judgment will be considered
law, but one does not teach so publicly, which could result in a
cheapening of the judgment and an undermining of the status of the
Court; (3) the need to take into account social value outlooks in the
public and the concern lest such a judgment be an edict with which the
public is unable to comply at a given time when it was issued.
John Rawls and Lon Fuller also recognized that the law does not
require one to perform impossible deeds as one of the minimum
conditions for the existence of justice. 17 Justice Beinish refers to this
point in her judgment and firmly determines that "[i]n the legal, social
and educational situation in which we find ourselves, there is to be no
compromise on account of jeopardizing the welfare and integrity of
minors... [t]he integrity of the body and soul of a minor is not to be
endangered by any corporal punishment whatsoever; the fitting criteria
have to be clear and unequivocal and the message is that no corporal
punishment is permissible."11 8 Justice Beinish even notes that parents
have certain defenses in the matter, although it must be stated that
implementation of these defenses is most problematic. Also in this
connection, the attempt of the Court to rely on the laws of other people to
show that the judgment is not exceptional, is a problem. As noted above,
many countries in Europe have prohibited corporal punishment in their
laws. A considerable proportion of the world's population, including
western countries, view it as an effective and legitimate means of
education and differentiates between corporal punishment and abuse.
They do not view the use of corporal punishment as being contrary to the
law or ethical standards. Reliance on the Scandinavian law is also most
problematic because of the unique way that it integrated an extensive
public educational campaign together with civil, not penal, legislation.
At the same time, one cannot ignore the fact that the new
prohibition, which was accompanied, as noted, by an alert public debate,
116. TAMAR MORAG, Children's Rights and the Law, in CHILDREN'S RIGHTS IN
ISRAEL: A COLLECTION OF ARTICLES AND SOURCES 17, 21 (Yitzchak Kadman and Galia
Efrat eds. 1999).
117. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF
LAW 41 (2 nd ed., 1969).
118. Plonit v. Israel, [2000] IsrSC 54(1) P.D. 145, para. 30.
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is slowly penetrating and being absorbed, even if at least partially, by the
Israeli public, in accordance with surveys on the subject. 1 9 In my
opinion, however, the test is not only of the outcome. One must also
look at the stages of the process compared to the public's feelings and
confusion in the interim period pending the acceptance, if at all, of the
prohibition. Such a look can help to improve the situation in countries
where a prohibition has been accepted without preparation of the public
mind by an understanding that some importance is to be attached to
upholding it even post factum, and as a warning signal for countries
interested in prohibiting corporal punishment in the future.
Cypriot Law took a different path of penal prohibition in legislation.
This is neither a prohibition through court ruling nor civil legislation, as
will be seen below in the law of some other European countries. 1" °
Section 7(1) of the Cypriot Constitution grants every child a right to life
and dignity,' 21 and this section also impacted the situation regarding
119. Tzimuki, supra note 102 (A survey of the National Council for the Child, taken
in 1996, according to which three out of four parents punish their children through
hitting, at least occasionally); Question: Is a parent allowed to give a light slap to a child
for the sake of his/her education?, YEDI'OT AHARONOT, February 21, 2000, (A survey
conducted a few days before the judgment was given in the Plonit case showed that 47%
of the public was of the opinion that a parent should be allowed to give a light slap to a
child for the sake of its education and only some 40% of the public was of the opinion
that one should not do so.); Beruriah Atar, Light Punishment, Heavy Price, HAARETZ,
February 2, 2001, (A survey conducted by Dr. Yitzchak Levav of the Mental Health
Services of the Ministry of Health and Dr. Roza Goffin of the Department for Social
Health at Hadassah Hospital in Jerusalem among a thousand people from the Jewish
sector found that a quarter of those asked viewed corporal punishment as "a good way to
inculcate good behavior" and not just as a permissible method of education. Levav and
Goffin emphasized that, in their opinion, the true rate is higher since some of those asked
had reservations about stating their real opinion.); data very similar was measured some
two years after the judgment and similar data was also measured (with a slight drop in the
percentage of supporters) in a survey conducted some three years after the judgment from
a survey conducted by the Geocartography Institute on "Violence towards Children," for
the National Council for the Child in 2003, it followed that some 37% of those asked
were of the opinion that it was permissible to hit children for the sake of their education
in one form or another. A change was recorded some six years after the judgment was
given, at the end of 2005. From a survey conducted by the Geocartography Institute
especially for a conference on the subject of "Five Years since the Prohibition on
Corporal Punishment" at the Sha'arei Mishpat College on November 14, 2005, it
followed that 79% of those asked held the opinion that children should not be hit for the
sake of their education while just 17% supported doing so. Yuval Lidor and Assaf
Zelinger, A New Survey: 50% of the Parents Hit their Children, MA'ARIV, June 7, 2007,
(noting that from another survey conducted by Shiluv Institute for the Israeli TV, channel
2, in the beginning of June 2007, it followed that although 50% of the parents use
corporal punishment for the correction of their children, only 10% think that it is a
legitimate and efficient way of education).
120. The review of Cypriot law was made on the basis of BITENSKY, supra note 13, at
174-80.
121. Cypriot Constitution, 1960, art., VII § 7.
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corporal punishment in Cyprus as it did in Israel.
In 1994, the Cypriot legislature enacted the Prevention of Violence
in the Family and Protection of Victims Law. 122 This law prohibited any
form of corporal punishment by a parent or other caretaker and the
punishment for it was an increased fine or imprisonment. In 2000, this
law was replaced with a new law, Law 119(I), the Law which Provides
for the Prevention of Violence in the Family and Protection of
Victims. 123  This law is part of the Cyprus Criminal Code. The
innovations it contains against its predecessor mainly concern victims'
testimonial matters of domestic violence. The law determines that, "[f]or
purposes of this Law, violence means any unlawful act, omission or
behavior which results in the direct infliction of physical, sexual or
mental injury to any member of the family by another member of the
family.' 24 According to the new law, and like the situation in Israel,
battery in the familial context is more grievous than battery between
strangers and the punishment for it is, therefore, increased to two years or
an increased fine, as against one year imprisonment when the offense is
not committed in the familial context. The law also determines a
handling mechanism enabling and obliging the welfare services
intervention in giving advice and mediation to members of the family for
resolution of the problems that led to the violence or which, it is
suspected, will lead to it. This is an important part of the law that also
focuses on treatment of the victims of the violence and not only on the
punishment of the perpetrators thereof.
It is true that corporal punishment is not explicitly mentioned in the
law but scholars explain that the law applies to every form of violence vis-
A-vis children. 125 In one of the recent decisions of the Cypriot Supreme
Court regarding this law, it was determined that violence vis-d-vis a child
hurts one's dignity and domestic violence in general is wrong and unjust
because a man's home should be his castle and a source of affection, not of
violence. 126 At the same time, it may be noted that, as in Israel, the
Supreme Court in Cyprus also related to this section of the law through
incidents of serious violence that approached the level of abuse. In one of
the cases, a mother abused her daughter systematically and intentionally,
both physically and mentally, with slaps, beatings with her open hand and
122. The Prevention of Violence in the Family and Protection of Victims Law, Act of
June 17, 1994, Law 147(1), OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE REPUBLIC OF CYPRUS No. 2886.
123. The Law that Provides for the Prevention of Violence in the Family and
Protection of Victims is, Annex (I), Laws of Cyprus 2000/I, Law No. 119(1) of 2000,
Criminal Code, Ch. 154.
124. Id. at § 3-(1).
125. BITENSKY, supra note 13, at 175.
126. Attorney General of the Republic v. Eleni Ioannou (CA 7403, Nov. 27, 2003).
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objects such as a broom or wooden spatula as well as biting,127 while in
another case a father sexually assaulted his daughter. 28 Another case
involved a father beating his son's entire body with a belt.
29
The change in Cyprus was thus through legislation rather than case
law, in contradistinction to Israel. A further significant change concerns
the education and instruction of the public. Unlike in Israel, the legislative
change in Cyprus occurred hand-in-hand with an attempt to educate the
public regarding the new legal status. The prohibition on corporal
punishment and its significance was published in leaflets, and on posters,
and stickers. This educational campaign was run by the welfare services
and non-governmental organizations. 130 A survey conducted in October
2000, the same year in which the prohibition was passed in the new law
and six years after enactment of the initial law on the matter, points to the
fact that only 15% of those asked were of the opinion that beating children
is socially acceptable in practice as a method for bringing up children.
131
A critique on the exaggerated strength of the model should be
expressed, mainly with regard to Israeli law but also with regard to
Cypriot law, because it seems that not all the implications were taken
into account. Israel has forbidden corporal punishment in the family with
a clear penal prohibition through a judgment of the Supreme Court, which
has the authority of a statute, as such judgments constitute a binding
precedent. Cyprus prohibited it in legislation in the Criminal Code.
In Israel meanwhile, no statute has been enacted on the subject with
respect to the family unit. There is a significant difference between these
two paths. The process of enacting legislation is lengthier, gives
expression to trends and desires of various public representatives, and
permits better inculcation following publication of the legislative process
and public knowledge that there is a statute on the subject. A court
judgment, on the other hand, is sudden, more subject to dispute as it is
given in a limited composition of justices (three in the Israeli case, with
one of the justices not having considered the issue of corporal punishment
at all) and could, therefore, create antagonism vis-A-vis the decision,
primarily on the part of sectors of the population in which corporal
punishment has been accepted since olden times. In many cases, such
decisions are opposed because they do not sit well with the public in a
multi-cultural society. Moreover, when there is no statute on the matter, but
127. Id.
128. Attorney General of the Republic v. A. B. (CA 7329, Aug. 6, 2002).
129. BITENSKY, supra note 13, at 176.
130. Id., at 179.
131. ROWAN BOYSON, EQUAL PROTECTION FOR CHILDREN: AN OVERVIEW OF THE
EXPERIENCE OF COUNTRIES THAT ACCORD CHILDREN FULL LEGAL PROTECTION FROM
PHYSICAL PUNISHMENT 33-4 (Lucy Thorpe ed., 2002).
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only a judicial decision, albeit binding, the norm is easily forgotten and
accepted by the public. 
132
Another significant difference arises from the fact that, in Israel, no
government information campaign was held to inculcate the new norm
but only a campaign of very limited scope financed by the NCC, which is
a private association. In Cyprus, there was such a campaign. The
importance of such can be great, even critical. The extensive public
debate following the passing of the prohibition in Israel proves this.
A third difference lies in the existence of mandated reporting which
applies to everyone in Israel. It requires everyone to report the battery of
a minor by his/her parents or caretakers and this obligation has been
construed by some scholars as applying to corporal punishment of any
level. If activated with respect to every instance of light corporal
punishment, this obligation could intensify the problem of the intrusion
of the law into the family unit by requiring everyone to intervene in other
families' matters.
However, it would not be correct to say the problem is latent only in
the Israeli solution and not in the Cypriot. The problem of the strict-
penal legal intervention model does not end only with legislation and a
campaign to inculcate the norms although they can certainly help blur
over difficulties.
The legal sources, legislation and court ruling, mentioned do indeed
depict a real and honest desire to protect children from injury at the
hands of their parents. This objective is basically positive and there is no
doubt it indeed results in children being protected and serves as a tool for
saving them from harsh acts by those who are supposed to be guarding
them, their parents. Some hold that a prohibition on corporal
punishment, and in legislation, will strengthen the principles of
democracy and respect for human rights. 133  If, however, the
ramifications of these sources are examined, particularly in Israel, then a
very problematic picture emerges concerning serious injuries in the
whole family unit if these sources are to be used in cases of light corporal
punishment.
There are two main problems with the application of the strict-penal
intervention model. One is the negative incentive for a parent not to
educate and discipline his children1 34 if he knows that using light
corporal punishment could result in charges against him and possibly
destroy his family. The other problem is the intrusion of the law into the
family by way, specifically of the penal law, with all its ramifications,
132. Ezer, supra note 16, at 189.
133. BITENSKY, supra note 13, at 357.
134. Schuz 2001, supra note 105, at 173.
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particularly in the pointed fashion made in Israel. The judgment in Plonit
has overly sweeping repercussions on all subsequent judgments, but the
danger is also and mainly in extreme and unbalanced interpretations of the
previous legislation. The judgment unequivocally decided in fact that the
right of parents to educate their children as they see fit, recognized more
than once in case law, takes a back seat, according to the new
interpretation, to any injury, even the slightest and even for educational
purposes, to the body of a child. Interpretation in accordance with that
sweeping prohibition results in parents who punish their children with light
corporal punishment being exposed to the operation of temporary criminal
and other (such as detention or restraint) remedies against them which
exist in each country and could be used against parents. As noted,
mandated reporting exists with respect to everyone in Israel like in many
United States jurisdictions. The detention could be either an investigative
detention or detention until completion of proceedings. In addition, a
restraining order against approaching the home could be imposed. The
incidence of these remedies could be in certain cases for days, weeks, or
even months.
The opening up of all these processes could derive from an overly
literal use of mandated reporting on offenses of domestic violence, both
by professionals that treat the family and by the general public. Thus,
not only the basic rights of the parent might be prejudiced, to which
thought should also be given, but first and foremost, the damage is to the
whole family. The arrest and restraint of a parent might constitute
painful, but necessary "root treatment" in cases of serious violence, but
other balances can be thought of when the acts of the parent are light and
intended for educational purposes. The situation could still be reparable
in Israel, if the legislation is construed such that it does not apply to light
corporal punishment; however it is most doubtful whether this will be
done in view of the Plonit judgment. The situation described has not
lead to any decrease in the level of violence of parents or of children. On
the contrary; there is a constant rise in grievous instances of abuse and
violence of parents against their children and of children against each
other, despite the legal developments.
135
If it is decided to press charges against a parent who used light
educational corporal punishment on his child, then according to the Plonit
judgment, the parent has a few defenses that are not applicable in most
cases, in practice and in fact. The Court also did not provide tools in the
form of educational alternatives that it views as legitimate instead of the
135. As noted, the latest research points to 50% of Israeli parents that corporally
punish their children, even though 90% think it is not an efficient and legitimate way of
education. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
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use of corporal punishment. Also there is considerable concern that such a
decisive judgment, combined with the implications of the legislation on the
different levels could upset the delicate balance between deterrence and
rehabilitation considerations. The victim who was attacked could also
suffer. When all of this could happen following light corporal punishment
and not only following serious corporal punishment and abuse, this is an
overly sweeping intervention.
These results are difficult, mainly on the background of a judgment
that could become "an edict with which the public is unable to comply"
and "this is the law but one does not teach so publicly," and it is dubious
whether the Israeli Supreme Court gave thought to all the ramifications
of its judgment. It has to be understood that not everything that is not
desirable in terms of conduct can be legally prohibited.
The attempt to fight previous norms and change them specifically
through the penal law could seriously harm family and society. And, as
noted, this could be even more problematic when such a substantive
change is made through court rulings, without preliminary preparation or
readying the public mind through legislative measures spread over time
and giving different groups in the population a possibility for expressing
themselves.
Professor Leslie Sebba determines that it may reasonably be assumed
that the norm set in the Plonit judgment reflected mainly a position of a
"socio-legal elite" rather than a broad socio-cultural consensus. 136 If Plonit
is examined in accordance with the conditions enumerated by William
Evan for an effective absorption of a new legal norm, as against the need
to recognize the limits of the law's power, then a large problem arises.137
Evan determined that: (1) such a norm has to be expressed by the
legislature; (2) it has to rely on previous cultural traditions; (3) other
models for emulation have to be shown, i.e., other countries which adopt
the same norm; (4) the commitment on the part of the law enforcement
system to enforce the prohibition has to be unequivocal; (5) the existence
of accessible remedies for those hurt in cases where the norm is breached;
and (6) it is necessary for the new norm to come into immediate effect to
prevent objections. 138
It is easy to see that the first five conditions are not met by Israeli
law. The norm was expressed by the Court. There was no previous
cultural tradition on the matter in Israel (on the contrary, tradition
136. SEBBA, supra note 80, at 458-59.
137. WILLIAM M. EVAN, Law as an Instrument of Social Change, in APPLIED
SOCIOLOGY: OPPORTUNITIES AND PROBLEMS 285-293 (Alvin Ward Gouldner & Saymour
Michael Miller eds., 1965), reprinted in THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 554-562 (William M.
Evan ed., 1980).
138. Id.; see also SEBBA, supra note 80, at 458-59.
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supported corporal punishment in almost all sectors of the Israeli
population); other models for emulation were not listed, and those which
were mentioned in the judgment from Scandinavian countries, do not
match the prohibition laid down in Israel. The norm was not set there in
the penal law, as will be seen below, on dealing with them and those
similar to them. The Israeli public was not exposed to other models in
practice. The extent of the commitment of the law enforcement system
to enforce the prohibition does not appear unequivocal, and there are no
clearly accessible remedies for those hurt (the children) in cases of
breaching the norm. The only condition with which there is clear
compliance here is that of the immediate coming into effect of the new
norm, but in Sebba's opinion, this condition seems problematic. 3 9 One
has to agree, at least for the purpose of this research, when Sebba says it
is difficult to expect a large part of the public to change its way of life
overnight without an adjustment period to allow a gradual absorption of
the new norm.
These problems are more serious in a multi-cultural society. The
legal reference to the issue of corporal punishment in a multi-cultural
society clarifies even more sharply the approach of the Court as it sees
itself as intervening and determining educational norms, while
emphasizing that such norms are to be imposed on the entire population,
even though its components differ from each other culturally. Various
sectors in Israeli society did not come to terms with the outcome of the
judgment. Some, such as religious circles, were even angry that the
judgment, which covered scores of pages, did not mention the attitude of
Jewish law on the subject, with the well-known verse, "[h]e who spares the
rod hates his son; but he who loves him is careful to discipline him."'140 It
is true that it is possible to identify different schools of thought in Jewish
law, some of which are strictest with parents who punish their children
corporally. 141 However, it can be assumed that any reference to this law,
in a country twenty-percent of whose population defines themselves as
religious, while many others define themselves as traditional, would have
helped introduce the norm or at least softened part of the antagonism
towards it.
In other groups corporal punishment is more acceptable, for
example, in the Arab sector and among immigrants, the judgment was
139. SEBBA, supra note 80, at 459.
140. Proverbs 13:24.
141. Binyamin Shmueli, Corporal Punishment of Children by their Parents under
Jewish Law-Traditional Approaches and Modern Views, 10 PELILIM 365, 382-420
(1992); Binyamin Shmueli, Corporal Punishment of Children in Jewish Law: Traditional
Approaches Meet Modern Trends-A Comparative Study, 18 JEWISH LAW ANNUAL
(2007) (unpublished article on file with the Jewish Law Annual).
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not seen as being common to all groups. The strict-penal intervention
model is insufficiently tolerant with respect to religious, traditional, or
ideological opinions and beliefs coming from special sectors of the
population and new immigrants, and does not always look for a suitable
way to handle the problem when the danger of destruction of the family
among those groups could be much greater. Nor does it try sufficiently
to speak to those groups in their language. Such being so, these groups
accept the changes either with indifference or antagonism. This critique
is not tantamount to suggesting that any conduct of a certain group
should be allowed even if it grievously prejudices children's rights.
Some thought should, nevertheless, be given as to whether, in the mild
cases, an interim path could not be found that would, on the one hand,
retain children's rights and enable value-oriented norms to be introduced
to that sector while being careful not to cause harm as far as possible to
sectarian beliefs and opinions. The goal of bringing population groups
closer to each other, rather than sowing antagonism amongst them
against the governmental authorities in general and the courts in
particular, is also important and has to be balanced with children's rights,
although it is clear that the children's rights must prevail in principle.
One of the possibilities, if the whole issue has already been
discussed in the penal context, is to "utilize" both parts of the criminal
judgment, the verdict and the sentence, in such a way that, if parents are
convicted, it will be possible to be lenient with their punishment. This is
particularly the case for new immigrant parents and more so for those
who came from countries in which corporal punishment was permissible.
As noted, legislative measures that were taken in other countries can blur
the problem, not resolve it.
With innovative judgments in various areas, there is a tendency of
the courts to restrict the ruling and to hedge it with reservations so that it
will not break through any barriers. With the judgment in the Plonit
case, the Court also tried to do so but, seemingly, without much success
leaving the legal situation vague and uncertain. The prohibition on
corporal punishment is sweeping and almost absolute and, even if one
step back is taken in an attempt to apply general and specific defenses, in
practice it is very difficult to see how they could exist in view of the
legal situation and the social atmosphere reigning after the judgment. If
there is any understanding that parents should be allowed to exercise
reasonable force in order to maintain order, not by way of the de minimis
defense, as these are two separate defenses, then the Plonit judgment
should be hedged explicitly and not in some fuzzy manner.
It is true scholars point out that several years is too short a time to
examine the extent of the prohibition's acceptance and assimilation among
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the public, since this has to be examined over many years. 142 Already
now, as noted, one can point to a great problem, at least theoretically,
particularly for the Israeli method.
Thus, strict-penal intervention, mainly through a judgment without
any preparatory educational campaign readying the soil, is unsuitable for
the unique nature of the family unit and the desire to give it some
autonomy, albeit delineated and limited, and to permit it a certain internal
dynamic without outside interference. The model relates to the rights of
the individual, i.e. the child, as to those of any other individuals, and this,
in principle, is only right. However, it does so often, without a necessary
sideways glance to the child's place in a family unit. The intention of this
model is certainly desirable, but its actions are problematic because it goes
much too far and does not foresee the possible damage to the family unit
and the various ramifications in the spheres of law and society. One
cannot view parent/child relationships only through an individualistic
approach at the center of which is an individual versus an individual.
Family considerations also have to be taken into account. If the case is
serious, there is no question of the need for criminal law to be invoked.
But when it comes to light corporal punishment, things are more
complicated. Denying parental authority and parental discretion in too
many instances, particularly by using the most heavy-duty legal tool, the
penal law, could harm not only the parents causing the injury but also the
injured children. This is particularly so when the intervention is made
through a court judgment and not by preparation of the public mind, as
happened in Israel, but it is problematic even when the intervention is
through legislation, as in Cyprus.
Truth be told, the nature of the intervention in the opinion of this
model is preferable tenfold to the nature of the intervention or non-
intervention according to the minimal legal intervention model, which
sacrifices on the altar of the dynamic of the family unit, the rights of the
weak members of the unit, primarily the children. Both models lack
balance with their emphasis on one important aspect, their neglect of
another important aspect, and by approaching the issue one-sidedly with
over-simplification.
If so, from the strict-penal legal intervention model, the need should
be adopted for extensive defense of the rights of children, the weaker ones,
first and foremost, their right not to have painful corporal punishment
inflicted on them; although, a smarter interim method should be found for
the application of matters currently in practice. This interim model has to,
on the one hand, fight for the rights of children in accordance with the new
changes, but, on the other hand, it must strike a balance between these
142. BITENSKY, supra note 13, at 209; Ezer supra note 16, at 212-13.
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rights and the rights and duties of parents, while being on guard lest the
family be harmed. The moderate legal intervention model that was
presented in the former part of this Article lacks the uncompromising will
to fight for children's rights, although its balance is proper in principal.
The model that will be presented in the next part provides a preferable
balance between both family and individual approaches and also between
different considerations.
D. The Civil-Rights Legal Intervention Model: Gap Between Sweeping
Declaration and Moderate Enforcement-Several European
Countries
In order to create an opening for a principled legal attitude with the
purpose of educating the public in stages and in a way that will create
empathy for a judgment or legislation forbidding corporal punishment and
lead towards an edict with which the public is able to comply and to fill it
with content, there is possibly room to adopt a rationale of a structured gap
between a sweeping declaration and moderate enforcement. This approach
will be able to create a gap between a clear declaration, consistent with the
individualistic approach and with strict-penal legal intervention, and
moderate enforcement. The latter means light punishment for the parent or
even his non-conviction in mild cases, as follows from the family approach
and from moderate legal intervention. Such a "bridge" between the
approaches and the models would constitute a wise step that could convey
a firm message as to the importance of protecting children's rights without
irreparably harming the family unit in mild cases. This is the substance of
the civil-rights legal intervention model that will be presented in this
section through creative legal attitudes to corporal punishment. These will
be shown via balances adopted by the law in the countries of Scandinavia
and, in their wake, by other countries in Europe.
I will try to show how this model attempts to constitute a connecting
thread, bridging between rival models, particularly between intervention,
which is strict-penal sweeping ex ante but moderate ex post. This is done
by finding points of balance and compromise that will match the nature of
the modem family. I shall not evade the difficult question whether the
nature of the legal intervention that this model presents can be suitable for
every modem legal system. One should consider that a declarative
statement, the purpose of which is a legal declaration which it is not
intended to enforce in practice, does not contribute to the important facet
of deterrence. Obedience to the law out of a fear of sanctions constitutes
an important, and for some parts of society, prime motive for
implementation of the legal norm. Some have viewed enforcement almost
as a sine qua non for the validity of the legal norm itself while others have
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seen it as the initial legal norm and so differentiated, inter alia, between a
legal and a moral norm. 143 However, one has to be exact in that it is not a
matter merely of recommendations but of legal rulings for all purposes
which the law chooses of its own initiative not to enforce fully despite its
ability to do so. Enforcement of heavy duty legal norms, mainly in the
criminal sphere, does not always constitute the king's highway for true
internalization by the public. The law is certainly a tool for internalization
of norms, but not always the central tool. It, too, is often limited in terms
of its effectiveness. That being so, the civil-rights legal intervention model
is not just a reality sketch of desirable law nor is it disconnected from "the
ground" and daily life. Problems with the possible adjustment of the
model exactly the way it is written to a modem, western legal system will
be indicated. Large parts of it, however, can possibly help with the
construction of a practical proposal for an integrated model for resolution
of the basic dilemma.
Sweden was the first Scandinavian country and apparently of the
World to prohibit corporal punishment in legislation.144  Corporal
punishment had been accepted as a way of education in Sweden, as in
most countries of the world mainly in order to drive or beat the devil out of
the child. This resulted in many cases of child abuse. However, in 1949,
Sweden enacted the New Parental and Guardianship Code. This code
limited parental rights to administer physical punishment and determined
that such was reprehensible. Even if it was not a matter of an effective
remedy, it can be assumed that, for that period, this was a revolutionary
law. In 1958, Sweden prohibited corporal punishment in schools and in
1969, repealed the penal defense against the battery offense for parents
who hit their children for their education and caused light injuries. In
1979, the 1949 law, a civil rather than penal law, was amended in the
143. YIZHAK ENGLARD, AN INTRODUCTION To JURISPRUDENCE 25-30, 83-84 (1991).
Hans Kelsen holds in modem law the power to apply the sanction is the initial norm
while the substantive behavior with respect to which the sanction was determined is only
a secondary norm.
144. See BOYSON, supra note 131, at 24-25, 38; BITENSKY, supra note 13, at 154-70,
180-84; Newell, supra note 16, at 219; Joan Senzek Solheim, A Cross-Cultural
Examination of Use of Corporal Punishment on Children: A Focus on Sweden and the
United States, 6 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 147 (1982); Dennis Alan Olson, The Swedish
Ban of Corporal Punishment, 4 BYu L. REv. 454-55 (1984); Michael Freeman, Children
are Unbeatable, 13 CHILD. & SOCIETY 130, 139 (1999); Durrant, supra note 36; Johnson,
supra note 25, at 479 ;Edwards, supra note 27, at 1019; Ezer, supra note 16, at 170-75;
ADRIANNE HAEUSER, Stopping Corporal Punishment of Children in Order to Prevent
Abuse, in CHILDREN IN ISRAEL ON THE TRESHOLD OF A NEW MILLENIUM 221, 223-31
(Asher Ben Aryeh and Yaffa Zionit eds., 1999); see also Adrianne A. Haeuser, Banning
Punishment of Children: Evaluating Sweden's Success for the U.S., 8th National
Conference on Child Abuse and Neglect (Oct. 22-25, 1989). It should be noted that,
today, Sweden is a very secular and liberal country.
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parliament by a vast majority of 250 yeas with only 6 nays, in the wake of
a public committee on behalf of the parliament. The current formulation,
after a further amendment in 1983, provides that: "[c]hildren... are to be
treated with respect to their person and individuality and may not be
subjected to physical punishment or any other humiliating treatment."1 45
The Swedish legislation does not differentiate, for this purpose,
between a parent and another person in charge of the child. It establishes a
right for the child and does not spell out to whom the obligation applies.
The right was legislated as part of a specifically civil law (on the same
lines as Section 10 of the Pupils' Rights Law in Israel) which does not
contain accompanying penalties helping its quick and impressive passage.
Seemingly, one would be accurate in saying from the section that the right
of the child is not to be exposed specifically to demeaning corporal
punishment because corporal punishment was compared to any other
demeaning parental conduct, while corporal punishment intended for an
educational purpose which is not demeaning is not forbidden. The letter of
explanation that the Swedish Ministry of Justice sent to all households
following the last amendment to the law, stated that the purpose of the law
was not to permit any form of hitting children apart from a light smack to
keep a child away, for example, from a burning stove or an open window
where there was a danger that he or she might be injured and hurt. 14 6 This
letter was just one part of an extensive publicity campaign for that statute.
Leaflets and colored booklets were also distributed, entitled, "Can you
bring up children successfully without smacking ('Smich och dask')?"
Advertisements were placed on milk cartons and appeared on television,
specifying the reasons for enactment of the statute and describing how to
bring up a child with discipline without smacking. The Swedish
government also established an ombudsman for children's complaints. At
the same time, many items were introduced into the school curriculum
about family life and parenting and programs were also initiated for
parents. Over the years, similar additional manifestos were published, on
the background of attempts by various groups, among them Christian
religious groups, to attack the statute in which it was emphasized that
beating a child for any reason is prohibited just as it is for an adult. The
Swedish Ministry of Justice was patient. The publicity campaign, intended
to prepare public minds for the future change, was spread over fifteen
years and it seems that it bore fruit.
Since the enactment of the statute until the end of the Twentieth
145. New Parental and Guardianship Code, 6:1 (Swed).
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Century, hardly any cases were recorded in Sweden where parents were
put on trial because of corporal punishment. This fact may be firmly
associated with the results of the surveys conducted during those years that
pointed to internalization of the messages of the legislative educational
campaign in the Swedish public. This contributed to breaking the
traditional inter-generational cycle of corporal punishment as well as a
drastic decline in support for this measure and the assimilation of the need
for the use of alternative methods of education, such as denying the child
benefits or sending him/her for a "time out. ' 147 It can be argued that some
of the respondents in the surveys were concerned about expressing a
position in support of corporal punishment and, that being so, replied as
they did; but this datum is taken into account in every survey. Moreover,
even if some of the respondents did not answer honestly, the fact that the
new legal and social situation resulted in their embarrassment (that they
are ashamed of resorting to smacking for education and are not willing to
admit it even in an anonymous survey) is some success in itself.
However, this is subject to dispute among scholars. Some argue the
campaign succeeded but since it is about a trend, and the prohibition was
in fact enacted, as has been seen, in stages and over a period of decades
(unlike, for example, in Israel), the process seems natural to the public
and one that would have happened even without legal intervention.
Parents internalized the prohibition and many of them indeed are
adopting alternatives. Others hold that the prohibition acted as a two-
edged sword. It hauled in its wake permissiveness in the education of
children and, if the tool of corporal punishment is taken from parents,
147. The surveys are mainly mentioned in Haeuser and Newell. See Haeuser, supra
note 144; Newell, supra note 16. In 1965, 53% of parents in Sweden supported corporal
punishment as a sometimes necessary method of education. In 1971, their number had
declined to 35% and, in 1981, to 26%. By 1995, only 11% supported corporal
punishment while 78% opposed it in any form, even mild. 56% reported that they use
alternative methods of education. 22% admitted that they had, nevertheless, used
corporal punishment on their children although they do not support it and excused having
done so by saying that they were being harassed by their children in that situation.
Towards the end of the Twentieth Century, an increase was recorded in cases of violence
in general and child abuse in particular in Sweden but no one specific factor for this was
found. Suggestions were raised, such as serious economic problems from which Sweden
suffered in 1990 as well as joining the European Union in 1994. This enabled freer entry
of merchandise, including drugs, to the country. Either way, no increase was recorded
specifically in cases of mild corporal punishment and no connection was made between
enactment of the law and that increase. See Haeuser, supra note 144, at 228-29.
BITENSKY is of the opinion that research regarding the non-change and growth in youth
violence shows the road is still long for change also in Sweden for, if there is less
corporal punishment in the home, it would have been expected that the children would be
less violent also at school. See BITENSKY, supra note 13, at 160. With all due respect,
the reference is to just one indicator. According to her, many cases are not reported such
that the phenomenon is much larger. To this, one may answer that there is under-
reporting in many other countries.
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then when children go too far, parents often use a harsher punishment.148
There is also a dispute among scholars on the issue of penal
enforcement of those sections of the civil law that are not accompanied
by any sanction whatsoever. Some are of the opinion that these are civil
sections of declaratory force only and one cannot in Sweden (and in the
other countries of Scandinavia which will be mentioned below) indict a
parent for breach of this statute. 149 Others hold that it is possible and
they can be charged for battery, the punishment for which is up to two
years imprisonment and, in mild cases, up to six months imprisonment or
a fine. 150 The latter admit; however, that this is a theoretical possibility
and is not the purpose of the legislation. The purpose was education of
the public and setting a new norm in the hope that it would trickle
through and change the current situation without the intervention of the
penal law (alongside the desire, of course, to end the phenomenon). In
practice, parents who physically punish their children in a mild form are
not indicted. 15' Other Scandinavian countries followed Sweden and
under its influence enacted similar sections in their civil law.
In Finland, there was a prohibition on corporal punishment in
schools but not in the family from the latter part of the Nineteenth
Century. Here too, a process took place. In 1969, a defense for a parent
who administered corporal punishment was removed from the Finnish
penal code, but no section was legislated explicitly forbidding it. This
confused the public as to the legal status of corporal punishment. 152 In
1981, a public survey was conducted and sixty percent of those surveyed
were of the opinion that corporal punishment should be forbidden in
Finland, as was the case in Sweden.1 53 In view of these results, a law
was enacted in 1983, which was in fact consistent with the desire of the
majority of the public and did not give rise to public debates as in Israel.
And indeed, the law was passed with genuine naturalness and by
unanimous vote in the parliament, as part of the Child Custody and Right
of Access Act (and as part of comprehensive reforms in children's laws),
a section similar to, and more detailed than its Swedish counterpart. 54
148. BITENSKY, supra note 13 at 157-58.
149. Adrianne A. Haeuser, Reducing Violence towards U.S. Children: Transferring
Positive Innovations from Sweden, 18 (1988) (unpublished); see BITENSKY, supra note
13, at 156; Olson, supra note 144, at 453-55; Murray A. Straus & Carry L. Yodanis,
Corporal Punishment by Parents: Implication for Primary Prevention of Assaults on
Spouses and Children, 2 U. Cm. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 35, 65 (1995).
150. BITENSKY, supra note 13, at 155-57.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 160 (noting that, in 1978, almost a decade after cancellation of the defense, 40%
of parents were of the opinion that corporal punishment was permissible and legal and the
professionals were also in confusion).
153. Id. 161.
154. Child Custody and Right of Access Act, Ch. 1, § 1. The objects of custody are
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The section came into effect at the beginning of 1984. As expected,
there has been a large decrease in the use of corporal punishment since
1983 in Finland. 5 5 Here, the purpose of the prohibition was an attempt
to educate parents to set boundaries for their children using positive
measures and without the use of hitting that would not lead to an
indictment, and to bring this to the knowledge of the public. 56 Finland
did not rest on its laurels. Although the statute was passed with
widespread public agreement, an extensive educational campaign was
launched to present educational alternatives to corporal punishment,
consisting mainly of advertising through the media and family
magazines, to the point where it can today be said that the public in
Finland is certainly aware of the norm.117
In Denmark, there has been an explicit prohibition since 1866 in the
penal code against parental violence upon children. In practice, however,
it was accepted that a parent and the spouse of a parent can use limited
force for the purpose of physically punishing a child for that child's
education, although this defense has been gradually whittled away in case
law. 5 8 Some years after the developments in Sweden, similar sections
were enacted in some of Denmark's civil family statutes. 159 In 1997, a
to ensure the well being and the well balanced development of a child according to his
individual needs and wishes, and to ensure for a child close and affectionate human
relationships in particular between a child and his parents. A child should be ensured
good care and upbringing as well as the supervision and protection appropriate to his age
and stage of development. A child should be brought up in a secure and stimulating
environment and should receive an education that corresponds to his wishes, inclinations
and talents. A child should be brought up in a spirit of understanding, security and love.
He shall not be subdued, corporally punished or otherwise humiliated. His growth
towards independence, responsibility and adulthood shall be encouraged, supported and
assisted.
155. BoYSON, supra note 131, at 25. A survey conducted among teenagers in 1989
showed that 19% of the youth had been exposed to mild corporal punishment at home
and 5% to harsh corporal punishment. Only 5% thought that they would use corporal
punishment for the education of their own children. Id.
156. BITENSKY, supra note 13, at 25 (arguing that, following a conversation with
someone at the Finnish Ministry of Justice, it would theoretically be possible to press
criminal charges against a parent who administered corporal punishment on one of the
battery offenses according to Finland's Penal Code, the punishment for which varies
from a fine to imprisonment actually forbidding corporal punishment is civil. According
to scholars, the general defenses in the Penal Code, such as self-defense, do not apply to
corporal punishment vis-A-vis a minor).
157. BOYSON, supra note 13 1, at 24-25.
158. LINDA NIELSEN & Lis FROST, Children and the Convention: The Danish Debate,
in CHILDREN'S RIGHTS-A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 65-92 (Michael. Freeman ed.,
1996); BOYSON, supra note 13 1, at 180.
159. A section was enacted requiring a custodian or caretaker to protect the child
from physical violence, mental cruelty and any other form of humiliation, as part of the
Minor's Act, § 7(2) and the Act on Custody and Access, § 2. An amendment was also
added to the Parental Custody and Care Act in 1985, according to which: "[A child] may
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further amendment was introduced and the formulation now provides that
"the child has the right to care and security. He/she shall be treated with
respect for his/her personality and may not be subjected to corporal
punishment or any other offensive treatment."'1 60 Scholars point out that
this section does not actually change what was accepted in practice since
charges were pressed against parents only in isolated cases and the parents
were convicted only when the beating injured the child, leaving marks on
him. This policy of restraint in parental prosecution continues to this
day. 161 The explanatory notes further provide that the legislature did not
intend to intervene in the privacy of the family more than it did prior to
enactment of the statute. 162 Here too, scholars argue that parents and
caretakers can face criminal charges with respect to corporal punishment
in accordance with the various battery offenses in the Penal Code, 163 but is
seems merely theoretic, if at all.
In 1972, Norway repealed a provision in the Penal Code that was
enacted in 1926 and gave parents a right to use reasonable corporal
punishment for the education of a child. Some fifteen years later an
amendment that was made in family law came into effect. The
amendment gave a child the right not to be exposed to corporal
punishment. The law, as formulated, seems to contain only cases in
which it can be discerned that the use of violence could cause physical or
mental damage, because it provides that, "[t]he child shall not be
exposed to physical violence or to treatment which can threaten his
physical and mental health.' ' 164 With this, Norway permitted a somewhat
larger expanse for parents than the other Scandinavian countries.
Some scholars still argue that, following the preparatory works of
the law, two parental conducts are still permissible even after enactment
of this law. 165 First, use of force, such as holding or blocking, especially
smaller children, to prevent them from hurting themselves or others or
from destroying property. This is actually similar to penal "self-defense"
which also applies vis-A-vis others. Second, small smacks on the child's
hands or clothed buttocks as a spontaneous reaction may be used as some
sort of de minimis defense. Here too, it is a matter of civil law and there
are those who argue that parents or others in charge of the child can face
criminal charges for corporal punishment through the offense of battery.
not be subjected to corporal punishment or other degrading treatment."
160. BITENSKY, supra note 13, at 180.
161. NIELSEN & FROST, supra note 158.
162. BOYSON, supra note 131, at 38.
163. Id. at 182.
164. Parent and Child Act, art. 30 § 3, amended by the Amending Act No. 11, (Feb. 6,
1987) (Norway).
165. BITENSKY, supra note 13, at 166.
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This is a policy of restraint on the part of the prosecution and charges are
not pressed against parents for mild corporal punishment.
166
Norway also held an educational campaign, to inculcate the norm.
Leaflets about the new law were distributed to the public, albeit by non-
governmental organizations. The matter of the prohibition was
publicized extensively in the press and paid advertisements. The
ombudsman gave interviews on television and Norway arranged for
parent training programs to discuss methods of child education, on the
issue of corporal punishment. The ombudsman published a statement in
2002 to the effect that the prohibition had been taken on board among
young and old in Norway and that corporal punishment was no longer
acceptable in Norwegian society.1 67 Other countries, including Austria
and Germany, followed the path of the Scandinavians.
Austria prohibited corporal punishment in schools in 1975.168 With
respect to the family unit, as with the Scandinavian countries, Austria
began the process in 1977 with the removal of a defense in the Penal Code.
Similar to Finland, a counter law was not immediately enacted, leaving the
public somewhat confused and perplexed as to the legal situation on the
issue. In the 1980's, the Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of the
Environment, Youth and Family started on preparatory work for creating a
prohibition in law. In 1989, the Austrian parliament voted unanimously
for a section of law that prohibits corporal punishment. Prohibitions in the
civil code provide that, "[t]he minor child must follow the parent's orders.
In their orders and in the implementation thereof, parents must consider
the age, development and personality of the child; the use of force and
166. Id. at 167. Charges can be pressed for the slightest battery offenses even if no
bruises are made on the child's body. In other words, the reference is to a behavioral, not
consequential, offense. With more serious offenses, harm has to be proven; it may be
noted that there is no division in Norway between penal and civil codes and everything is
in one law: Norges Lover. A case that was discussed in Norway illustrates the possibility
of pressing criminal charges although it is already here a matter of a beating causing a
contusion. A child of less than two years of age hit his father on the hand. The father
spontaneously hit the child on the face, his lip swelled up and he bled from the mouth.
The court of first instance acquitted the father, ruling that he had a right to put the child in
his place after he had hit him. The Supreme Court of Norway determined that it was an
offense and sentenced the father to a fine or two days in prison in lieu thereof, while
noting that this was not the way to put a child in its place (Rt-1990-1155 (388-90), quoted
there, pp. 167-78). According to the standards seen in the moderate intervention model
according to Canadian law, hitting in such a fashion would have been prohibited anyway,
being directed at a small child and causing a contusion.
167. Id. at 170.
168. Teaching Act § 47/3 (Austria). There is no similar legislation with respect to
other educational institutions but, here too, scholars argue that a correct analogy leads to
a prohibition in all the educational institutions. For the situation in Austria in details see
BITENSKY, supra note 13, at 171-74.
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infliction of physical or psychological harm are not permitted."' 169 There
are no defenses. The section does not explicitly mention corporal
punishment, but hangs the prohibition on the existence of physical or
psychological harm, which is similar to the Norwegian approach. Similar
to Scandinavia, Austria enacted the law primarily to influence the simple
man, with the intention of a gradual withdrawal from the norm that views
corporal punishment as an acceptable method for the education of children.
Here too, there are those who claim that, despite the fact that the
legislation is civil, parents, teachers, caretakers or people who are
responsible for children can be prosecuted if they used corporal
punishment against children. 7 ° Even the relevant criminal sections are
consequential and necessitate being able to point to physical or
psychological damage as a consequence of the battery. 171
In Austria, there was also a public campaign to disseminate
knowledge about the prohibition to the public and in schools. The policy
in Austria is strongly based on the welfare and education services and the
children's ombudsman, and less on literal enforcement of the law. A
survey conducted in Austria, some three years after imposition of the
prohibition, found that sixty-eight percent of parents were opposed to
corporal punishment, twenty-five percent smack occasionally and five
percent frequently and strongly.
72
Germany has perhaps the most impressive method, even if
theoretically, for handling the issue of corporal punishment. 73 Corporal
punishment in the German educational system is subject to resolution in
the sixteen federal states that comprise Germany. 74 With respect to the
family unit, various attempts to pass legislation that would forbid
corporal punishment began in the 1980's. In 1998, however, the
legislature prohibited any form of demeaning punishment, including
physical and psychological abuse, but no prohibition has yet been
legislated against corporal punishment. Scholars have construed the law
such that it does not apply to corporal punishment so long as it is
administered in response to an act of the child and does not go beyond an
169. Civil Code § 146a (Austria).
170. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Concluding
Observations on the Committee on the Rights of the Child: Austria 268, 270-71, U.N.
Doc CRC/C/il/Add. 14 (1997); see also BITENSKY, supra note 13, at 172.
171. Penal Code §§ 83, 92.
172. BOYSON, supra note 131, at 31-32. BITENSKY, supra note 13, at 174. In
Bitensky's opinion, however, in the absence of up-to-date research, it is necessary to wait
and examine the results after a decade at least. Id.
173. See Durrant, supra note 36, at 166-67; BOYSON, supra note 131, at 52-54;
BITENSKY, supra note 13, at 189-97.
174. Thirteen have imposed a ban on corporal punishment in their educational systems.
In the remaining three, it is the custom. Even with respect to day care centers, there is no
explicit legislation. BITENSKY, supra note 13, at 190.
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educational purpose. Here too, the new situation has created confusion
for the public and it was not known exactly what was allowed and what
was forbidden. The lack of clarity ended in 2000 with the legislation of a
civil statute, which declares that, "[c]hildren have the right to be brought
up without the use of force. Physical punishment, the causing of
psychological harm and other degrading measures are forbidden."'
' 75
One defense, non-punitive physical contact, exists. An, example of non-
punitive physical contact is the act of saving a child from some form of
danger such as running into the street or possessing matches.
The German government and private bodies also greatly invested in
a public education campaign. The campaign included placing large
posters on the streets, leaflets for distribution at clinics and other public
sites, the distribution of an explanatory booklet about the development of
children by social workers, and monthly distributions on the
development of children and ways to avoid corporal punishment for
parents, from birth until the child reaches the age of five years. Teachers
further speak about the prohibition in all classes.
There is also a dispute in Germany between scholars as to whether a
parent can be charged with corporal punishment through various penal
sections or whether these sections only apply with respect to levels of
gravity and intensity that go beyond mild punishment. An argument also
exists on the question of whether a criminal defense allowing parents to
punish their children in general terms and that applied to corporal
punishment prior to the explicit prohibition of 2000, still applies now so long
as the punishment is moderate, reasonable, and intended for educational
purposes. There are those who argue that the forbidden punishment is
specifically punishment that hurts, is dangerous, harmful to health, and
immoral because it is destructive for the education of children.
Still, after 2000, light punishment was not criminally forbidden. Others
are of the opinion that the 2000 prohibition invites a different interpretation
for this criminal defense allowing parents the use of corporal punishment in
some terms. Either way, even if criminal liability can be applied, there is a
section about the discretion of the prosecuting authorities not to go to court if
the offense is light and there is no public interest in pressing charges, a sort
of "defense" like that mentioned in the Plonit case in Israel. In some
contradistinction to Israel, however, in the more grievous cases, charges are
sometimes not pressed against the parents if the prosecutor is convinced that,
despite the public interest in doing so, proper therapeutic steps have been
taken.
176
175. German Ostracism of Force in Upbringing Act § 1631(1I) (Federal Law Gazette
2000).
176. See BITENSKY, supra note 13, at 191-92.
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This point raises a more interesting and impressive mechanism, if
only theoretically, that was developed in Germany, namely the extensive
range of statutes requiring the welfare services to act in virtually every
possible way to prevent conflicts in a family and to treat them when they
do occur. The emphasis is placed on the obligation of those welfare
services to advise and activate programs for a solution of the conflicts in
non-violent ways. The emphasis, therefore, is on guidance, direction, and
prevention, all by virtue of the law. The obligation is that of the
government, but it can send families to private institutions for consultation
and treatment. 177 In this, Germany actually presents an impressive balance
between an individualistic approach prohibiting corporal punishment of
children and a family approach. The latter is illustrated in that there is no
clear purpose for enforcement of the prohibition in criminal law and the
object is the education of the child. It is also illustrated by the emphasis
being placed on the duties of the State, through its various arms, to offer
training and directives for resolution of conflicts in the family by peaceful
means and to treat families in which such conflicts have appeared in the
past with kid gloves.
178
Scholars, nonetheless, point to only partial absorption of the
prohibition within the population of Germany, despite studies and
surveys being conducted in too short a time after the prohibition was
accepted.179  The UN Committee, while congratulating Germany on
passing the prohibition, called on it to conduct research and provide data.
This data pointed to a certain decline in the actual frequency of the
phenomenon and in the use of other violent means of education such as
hard slaps on the face and blows that cause bruises.
Scholars explain that this derives from the gradualness of the
acceptance of the prohibition. In other words, despite the public
confusion in the 1990's, the final resort of the preliminary legislation
also contributed to a decrease in the level of violence.'
80
That being so, the revolution, led by Sweden, has clearly impacted
other European countries. As stated by Bitensky, "[i]t only stands to
reason that people need to be aware of a law before they can obey and/or
internalize it." 181 This path seems sensible since it understands that
judicial force is problematic in the education of the public and it believes
in the power of declarative educational legislation through civil family
177. Id. at 190, 193-95 (discussing the particular statutes and their ramifications).
178. "It preserves the family intact and acquaints adults with proper, nonviolent child
rearing-something incarceration or a fine is not likely to do." Id. at 193.
179. Id. at 196. Bitensky points to research from 2000, the year the statute was
enacted, in which only 30% of those asked, parents and children, knew of the prohibition.
180. BITENSKY, supra note 13, at 196-97.
181. Id. at 189.
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laws, integrated fully with education and advertising in order to inculcate
the new norm.
However, is the civil rights legal intervention model compatible for
every modem society and legal system? The answer to this question is
not simple. The civil rights model proves that the existing and the
desirable can be drawn together under a single roof in the form of
creating a certain gap between declaration and enforcement. This is a
smart interim solution between strict-penal intervention focusing on the
individual and seemingly not taking the family unit as a whole into
account, and moderate intervention which makes the correct balances but
"sins" in an overly paternalistic overview which does not explicitly state
the importance of children's rights. Unlike the moderate legal
intervention model, the civil rights model indeed opts to focus on
children's rights, rather than sanctions for parents. The civil-rights legal
intervention model contributes to making up the missing parts of the
intervention puzzle in parent/child relationships.
Should the Scandinavian model be adopted in every country and is
it worth doing so or does this model still require proof as to its
suitability? Are we looking at a unique model that is suitable locally for
certain countries only, in accordance with the composition of the
population, the stability of the government and so on? There are those
who support this model as a universal solution and hold that, through a
not entirely legal (and certainly not a penal law) method of an
educational campaign pointing to alternatives to corporal punishment,
parents can be motivated to change their ways, and the law will not be
able to influence with the same force.' 8 2 This approach can be agreed
with in principle, but the method of Scandinavian law should be
examined in depth, from the decision to introduce reforms to the
successful completion of the task.
Sweden, followed by the Scandinavian countries and other countries
in Europe, intentionally opted to deal with the phenomenon through civil,
not criminal, legislation and to combine it with an intensive publicity
campaign with a declared educational goal of uprooting corporal
punishment from the ground up and not in one stroke. This is a different
path than the one that was taken in the countries of the strict-penal
intervention model, in which a criminal prohibition was imposed on
corporal punishment out of the blue, without prior and tolerant
preparation of the public mind, through legislation and case law. What
we actually have here is a prohibition containing an explicit statement
against corporal punishment as an educational method, but one that is
formulated in terms of the rights of children and not containing any penal
182. Schuz 2001, supra note 105, at 184-85.
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or other sanction.
An inherent problem of declarative sections of law, associated with
the legal stability and application of the law, is not to be ignored. In the
countries looked at as part of the civil rights legal intervention model, as
in most countries of the world, there is an offense and a civil tort of
battery, and a parent who punished his or her child physically has no
defenses (in some countries, as noted, such defenses were repealed
explicitly). The legal situation on the issue of corporal punishment,
therefore, is not apparently so clear-cut because it is not certain which of
the following situations applies, a situation of no defenses that states a
negative arrangement, or a situation where the offense of battery does
not, ab initio, apply to corporal punishment, and a criminal sanction
cannot be activated with respect to it.
According to the first option, a negative arrangement means that
even mild corporal punishment is forbidden as any battery and charges
can be pressed with respect thereto (subject to defenses such as de
minimis). This model chose to create a gap between declaration and
enforcement and, in the relevant countries, charges are not pressed for
mild corporal punishment. However, this situation can be reversible, for
example, if violence should gain momentum. According to the other
option, the prohibition remains on the declarative and educating level
and in family laws only, and non-upholding of the defenses and even
their effective repeal does still not decree a negative arrangement.
Either way, as stated, the purpose of the prohibition, enacted as a
right of children, was not penal enforcement, even if there are those who
argue that theoretically, penal enforcement is also possible for the breach
of civil sections. There is in effect an understanding between the various
enforcement authorities, even if without backing in court rulings or
legislation, that in mild cases of corporal punishment parents are not to
be indicted. It is possible that this fuzziness is the secret of the success
of civil rights model, i.e., the public knowledge that the law has the
power to adopt sanctions, even if it does not do so, and the moderate
conduct of the enforcement authorities in practice. Sometimes the nature
of the force of the authority is not in activation of the force but in its very
existence and the public knowledge of it. Yet the interpretation is still
not clear-cut, and the situation in which indictments and civil actions are
not pressed could change. This is too dependent on the policy of the
prosecution authorities and the courts. This problem could reach the
proportion of prejudicing the legality principle, because a man in the
street does not know with certainty at any given time whether a light
smack for educational purpose amounts to a criminal offense or not.
One way or the other, this model is considered to be successful. The
Supreme Court in Israel also relied on the legal situation in the countries of
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Scandinavia as evidence for the need to lay down a legal prohibition on
corporal punishment in Israel. 183 With all due respect, however, this is
inaccurate since it is not a matter of a prohibition on the same level
because Israeli law took a significant step up and determined corporal
punishment a criminal and sweeping prohibition and not a civil right.
Another substantive difference is that in those European countries a
legislative action was taken in conjunction with a public campaign,
whereas in Israel corporal punishment was prohibited by way of a court
judgment, which was not received with broad agreement of the Knesset,
and did not follow the path of change and preparation of the public mind.
In different countries such as Sweden or Austria, the process lasted
decades and the legislation was finally enacted almost unanimously. This
datum should not be taken lightly. The Scandinavian school, being a
pioneer and precedent maker in banning corporal punishment, did not want
to shock the foundations of the legal systems and society by moving from
one extreme to the other. It chose, therefore, an integrated path of civil,
not penal, legislation and a public campaign. The large opposition to the
result of the Plonit case in Israel proves that it had also been necessary to
take a similar path and turn to the civil-legislative level, rather than the
penal-court ruling level and to combine it with an extensive propaganda
campaign. These two things were not done in Israel, not even postfactum
after the penal judgment.
One of the doubts regarding ramifications of the Scandinavian
solution concerns the multi-cultural matter. Society in Sweden and in the
other Scandinavian countries accepted the new norm in stages and with
almost total agreement following an intensive educational campaign.
However, today in Sweden there is not an inconsiderable minority of
immigrants from other countries in which corporal punishment has not
been totally prohibited, such as Turkey, the countries of the former
Yugoslavia, Portugal, Greece, in which corporal punishment was
forbidden only in the latter part of 2006, and also a Moslem minority of
three percent. 184  Denmark, Germany, and other countries that have
adopted the model also have minorities, but have not, to this point in
time, given rise to any problems in this context. A problem can,
nevertheless, arise in these countries with a lack of preparedness to
accept a law that runs counter to traditional customs, such as corporal
punishment, particularly on the background of the opening of large
immigrant quotas between the various European countries following the
183. Plonit v. Israel, [2000] IsrSC 54(1) P.D. 145, para. 22.
184. In the other countries of Scandinavia, there are fewer minorities (traditionally
about one and half percent are minority groups, although the number has been rising in
recent years in some of the countries).
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unification of Europe process. The declarative legislation might then not
meet the test of reality and strict sweeping practical enforcement might
become necessary, following education and information campaigns, also
and in particular within those sectors. An alternative would be turning a
blind eye to the frequent occurrences of corporal punishment within
those sectors out of tolerance and understanding that changes slowly
occur. Recommendations to adopt the civil rights method should,
therefore, be treated with some caution, particularly in countries with
relatively large minorities and a relatively conservative population.
In Israel, for example, the population consists of a considerable
amount of minorities and many groups that make up a mosaic of a
colorful multi-cultural society, on religious, ethnic, and ideological
backgrounds and on the background of large waves of immigration.
Research in Israel and elsewhere point to a problem at the level of
obedience to the law of minority groups and sectors in the population,
which perceive the law as an instrument in the hands of power groups
and controlling groups. The findings of this research indicates that,
when a conflict is created between the laws of a religion that permits
corporal punishment, and the state law which forbids it, or when there is
a sense of inequality and discrimination on the part of minority groups
because of a judicial decision which does not, it is argued, allow for the
groups of the multicultural society to take the law into their own hands or
distort it. This is also the case whenever an act of the legislature or the
court does not sit well with ideological, cultural, and religious views.
1 85
The same was determined in the past with respect to Germany, 186 and
also in general terms, with respect to the countries of Europe.
187
How would those minority groups have behaved in an encounter
with a declarative law only? Would they have obeyed it or would they
have been indifferent? Would an educational campaign really have
helped inculcate the new norms? To these questions, there is no decisive
and clear answer. Some of the societies are fairly conservative which
makes it difficult to carry out a revolution.
Another characteristic factor of different countries, such as Israel
and Italy, intensifies the problem. At the frequency with which
185. Arye Rattner and Dana Yagil, The Culture of the Law: The Law System in the
Eyes of the Israeli Society 2000-2002, The Center for Investigation of Crime, Law and
Society, University of Haifa (2002).
186. See research conducted in minority groups (Lebanese and Kurdish immigrants)
in Germany: Gunter Bierbraur, Toward Understanding of Legal Culture: Variations in
Individualism and Collectivism between Kurds, Lebanies and Germans, 28 L. & Soc'Y.
REV. 243 (1994).
187. See James L. Gibson & Gregory E. Caldiera, The Legal Culture of Europe, 30 L.
& Soc'Y. REv. 55 (1996) (discussing research that was conducted within societies in the
European Common Market that came to a similar conclusion).
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governments and ministers change in these countries, it is difficult to see
a governmental ministry adopting a long-term policy and launching a
budget-hungry campaign. A final factor of weight that also gives rise to
doubt as to the applicability of the Scandinavian model is that violence in
many countries is a national malaise, that can certainly push the law in the
direction specifically of strict-penal intervention.
With all these problems, and as will be seen below, the
Scandinavian model can, nevertheless, carry us forward toward an
effective solution.
IV. Integrated Model Proposal
A. Why Is there a Need for an Integrated Model?
The various models introduced express different levels of legal
intervention for parent/child relationships. The moderate legal
intervention model, currently existing in many countries, and the
minimal legal intervention model, which has faded from the western
legal landscape, both express the need to create a special autonomous
status for families. Such a status creates, a sort of intimate intermediate
unit in society between the individual and public. They are essentially
distinct in the level of legal intervention each imposes. Put another way,
one root bifurcated into two distinct modalities. One model views the
autonomy of the family unit as a buttressed and sanctified goal decreeing
almost total immunity against external legal intervention in the
patriarchal rule. Such autonomy is evident, in the father's independent
management of the family and by his ownership of the children, which
actually expresses excessive extremism and utilization of the weak by the
strong. The other model also emphasizes the autonomy of the unit but
strikes a balance between this goal and the rights and interests of the
children.
The starting point of the strict-penal model is almost the reverse of
the two models mentioned above. According to this model, hardly any
distinct arrangements are to be made for the family within the customary
law, and family disputes are to be heard with the legal tools for hearing
disputes between strangers. This model is decisive because the
individualism expressed in the consideration for children's rights is
preferable over the needs of the parent and family unit as a whole. This
model does not adequately emphasize the considerations at the core of
the family unit as a special part of society. Such considerations often
concern the child's interests. This model aspires to equate children's
rights with those of adults. However, it often fails to realize that
equalization is only relative to the nature of relationships between adults
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and minors, one in authority and subordinated by their needs, one
required to meet these needs, and one with a right free of obligation.
Children's equality to adults derives from human nature, while their
functions in society, the community, and family are different. There is
no real equality between children and adults, and one can at most only
refer to the correct balance between power and rights. One can talk
about giving the weak children more power than they have today to
protect them from damage to their body, dignity, integrity, and respect,
but it is not about making the relationship equal. It is about granting
more basic human rights to the children.
On the other hand, the moderate legal intervention model more
correctly balances between the independence and dynamic required for a
family and the rights of the child as an individual, but it is too
paternalistic and lacks a clear normative statement regarding invalidation
of parental conducts that are harmful to the child's body, dignity, and
spirit. It also lacks clear detailed guiding criteria allowing for indictment
and conviction. That being so, this model does not bridge with total
success between the minimal intervention model and the strict-penal
intervention model.
To a large extent, the conflict between the individualistic approach
and the family approach, in the juxtaposition of the models, is a conflict
of relational law. This examines the dilemma between the creation of a
special law for a special category of relations or arrangement of relations
through the previous law. It necessitates, in some opinions, passing
unique legislation addressing the special and intimate relationships
between the parties. 1
88
Indeed, from the review of the first three, the minimal, the strict-
penal, and the moderate models, for legal intervention in parent/child
relationships, there is also a need to create a special system of laws for
parent/child relationships. These laws will be suitable for the delicate
nature of the relationships in the family where there are power gaps of
strong versus weak, and they also characterize a system which is by its
very nature long-term. It is true that in certain cases attempts to deal with
disputes between parents and children will be possible using regular and
general legal tools, both penal and tort. For example, the criminal courts
already have the power, in such cases to lean more toward rehabilitation
and treatment. But taking special family considerations into account could
188. As such, it recalls another conflict in the matter of relational contracts in the
context of the laws of marital relationships. See Shahar Lifschitz, Organizing the
Couple-Contract in Israeli Law: An Elementary Draft, 4 KIRYAT HAMISHPAT 271, 295-
302 (2004-5); Ian Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations
under Classical, NeoClassical and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U. L. REV. 854
(1978).
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be more successful although caution is here indicated. The system must be
careful not to distance itself from the accepted legal norms, and must be
smart enough to create suitable internal arrangements, not unattainable
utopian arrangements. 189 Part of the solution presented below is built on
possible improvements in existing legislation. Case law is also very
important, but the route of judicial legislation cannot create legal certainty
and fitting assimilation of the norm.
The civil-rights model compliments most of the missing parts in the
puzzle theoretically presenting a more balanced approach illuminating
the gap between sweeping declaration and moderate enforcement. It
starts out more from the point of view of the child's rights, rather than
parental punishment. Important principles can be adopted from the
model to assist in constructing a desirable model, although this model
alone will not suffice. Further, it is unclear whether it is possible to work
in every country.
The existing models, therefore, do not succeed in adequately
balancing between the family approach and the individualistic approach.
Recognizing the problems with the existing models, creative and
refreshing thinking is needed to formulate a new model. Such a model
has to receive inspiration from the civil-rights intervention model,
mutatis mutandis, and the advantages must also be adopted from the two
rival modem models, the strict-penal and the moderate models, with their
disadvantages being remedied. This model, influenced by the interim
approach, must find the correct balance between the individualistic
approach and the family approach. Additionally, the best approach must
incorporate Bush and Folger's relational worldview, which tries to
connect the different approaches.1 90 This model must adopt an active
approach that tries to cope with social change through the law, and also
through propaganda and educational campaigns. Additionally, the
method of law must be gentle, but not sweeping on the penal end of the
spectrum.
Below, I propose an integrated solution for the basic dilemma,
189. The desirable situation with relational contracts, it is true, seems more attainable, in
Lifshitz's opinion, because the law has to give a seal of approval to the agreements between
the parties and the judgment anyway frequently does that, while this Article's interest is
dealing mainly with intra-family disputes in which there are no agreements from the outset.
On the other hand, the situation in parent/child relationships is perhaps simpler since there is
with these relationships, in most countries of the world as well as in Israel, not only unique
case law but also and mainly a unique system of legislation arranging these relationships in
the framework of the civil law. The reference is laws such as Custody Act, Family Act or
Parent and Child Act and the like. Maybe they are not good enough. Maybe they do not
resolve the basic dilemmas in an ideal fashion, but they do exist and thought should be
given as to how to amend them and also how to make use of them in the most creative
manner.
190. BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 8.
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which may be generally suitable for any modem legal system. The
integrated model starts with an initial assumption that a dispute between
a child and parent must be handled in a more gentle fashion than any
other dispute. It tries to balance various considerations. Some of these
considerations are interested in having the law wholly intervene
convicting the parent following conduct that harms the child. Other
considerations want to prevent this in some of the cases, at least out of
consideration for the child's interest and that of the family unit.
The solution presented attempts to avoid setting one rigid route that
may not address every case it is put in place to solve, and allows for
flexibility when necessary. The proposal emphasizes the importance of
maintaining harmony and restoring calm to the family unit. This is the
ultimate reason for exhausting alternative methods of recognizing
criminal action without abandoning the child's or family's interest.
Additionally, the method attempts to deter, convict, and punish in
appropriate cases that are grievous in nature and where the child/parent
relationship is unsalvageable.
B. The Integrated Model-A Collection of Proposals for a Solution
1. An Educational Publicity Campaign
Law is not a magic wand that creates miracles of metamorphosis
overnight. When evaluating the effects of the 1979 ban (in Sweden
B.S.) in particular, one should be mindful that even its twenty-five-
years tenure is not that long a time for profoundly entrenched,
nationwide attitudes and practices to undergo extensive
modification.1
91
How true this is, particularly with respect to countries such as Israel
and Cyprus where the process did not take decades as in Sweden. Unlike
Finland, the Israeli public was not prepared to accept the prohibition. In
Finland the parliament set about enacting a law after a survey that showed
the majority of the public wished to have such a law. It was also accepted
in the penal law and, as noted, in Israeli law by the judiciary and not
through legislation.
Psychologist Alice Miller explicitly calls on all countries of the
world to prohibit corporal punishment but not for social condemnation of
parents, rather for the education of the public and inculcation of the
matter into the public awareness through the use of legal tools. 192 This
191. BITENSKY, supra note 13, at 160.
192. "It is imperative to launch legislation prohibiting corporal punishment all over
the world. It does not set out to incriminate anyone but is designed to have a protective
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would seem to be an explicit plea for strict-penal legal intervention, but it
is tantamount to a recommendation to the legislature to think in different
directions and create a gap between a declaration and enforcement of the
law. The purpose of thinking outside the box is, first and foremost, to
educate the public and implement actual enforcement on the criminal
level.
When the Vice-President of the Supreme Court in Israel, Dr.
Shlomo Levin, retired from the bench, he stated at the farewell ceremony
that in the thirty-six years during which he had sat in judgment, he
concluded that:
The law is not the be-all and end-all and it is not capable of
correcting all the negative phenomena of society. The law is unable
to change improper modes of conduct that have become enrooted.
One should not despair of continuing the work but the main burden is
on education, from a young age, and on the existence of ground
work, and it is a pity that we are so far behind in this matter.
193
As mentioned, the civil-rights model attributes special importance
to ground work in educating the public, but not only through the law. It
is recommended to use a publicity campaign while attempting to
inculcate the prohibition into law. Such a campaign was undertaken by
the Ministry of Justice in Sweden and other countries. This shows that a
certain space is possible for mild corporal punishment in terms of not
pressing criminal charges against the parent, and at the same time
explaining to the public why corporal punishment is unacceptable and
should not be used to educate children, what damages it causes and the
proposed alternatives. Many parents would be surprised to know there
are other systems of education, no less effective than corporal
punishment and less harmful. The law can participate in the process with
statements in judgments (for example, by pointing out in an obiter
dictum what is desirable) and by justices giving lectures and writing
articles on the subject. The legal norm should be inculcated gradually
from an understanding that norms really cannot be changed overnight
even with a binding rule from the Supreme Court or legislation.
Some creativity can be shown in solution proposals including
and informative function for parents. Sanctions could simply take the form of the
obligation for parents to internalize information on the consequences of corporal
punishment available today. Information on the "well-meant smack" should therefore be
broadcasted to all, since unconscious education to violence takes its roots very early and
inflicts disastrous imprints. The vital interests of society as a whole are at stake." Alice
Miller, Every Smack is a Humiliation: A Manifesto, http://www.naturalchild.com/
alicemiller/manifesto.html (last visited July 15, 2007).
193. See http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-2447934,00.html, February 20, 2003
(last visited July 15, 2007).
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lectures, written information material, information material broadcast by
radio and television, advertising on consumer products, information
material on Internet sites, mailing of information material to homes, free
training courses or at a low, subsidized price, advanced study courses
and training of new parents as a condition for receipt of the maternity
grant.
Special importance is to be attributed to the existence of a campaign
specifically in a multi-cultural society. This is the correct way to try and
inject norms in which the majority is interested, at least ab initio, into
minority groups, not by force and not by using the (primarily penal) law.
Each sector has to be addressed in a way that is proper and suitable for it.
The training in each sector should be undertaken by appropriate
representatives, preferably representatives from that sector (lecturers,
doctors, community nurses, educators, psychologists, parent counselors,
men of religion and so on, perhaps even with lectures by judges). The
adjustment to change takes time particularly within certain sectors. The
internalization can be helped if, a person were to look to either side, he
would see his peers behaving according to the new norm.
For all this, a government budget has to be set aside rather than rely
on limited funding from private organizations. Resources are often non-
existent, despite the necessary resources to conduct a criminal process
against a parent and the damage to society as a result of criminal
processes are quite expensive. An investment has to be made in
preventive education. This is a simple cost-benefit analysis.
The strict-penal intervention model would seem to have reversed
the order and gone immediately to the stage of sweeping legal
prohibition. However, it is still important that information be
disseminated even in those countries which have already accepted a legal
prohibition on corporal punishment if such prohibition has not yet been
assimilated amongst the population and no decline in the phenomenon
can be noted.
2. Achievement of Social Consent through Postponing
Implementation of the New Norm
Another sophisticated way to inculcate the norms into society,
which could be suitable for each society contemporaneously with the
educational campaign, is to obtain social consent regarding the
undesirability of certain parental conducts by postponing the date for
implementation of the new legal norm. It has been suggested that a
prohibition on corporal punishment, and other parental conducts, be
determined but that the law states that the prohibition will come into
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force some time later, say after two years.'
94
Apart from these suggestions (and not in their stead), it can be said
that the law creates a gap not only between legislation of the norm and the
date on which it will come into effect, but also between the declarative
nature of the norm and its actual enforcement, even if only for the interim
period before the new norm becomes operative. More on this will be
presented in the next part.
3. Creation of a Reasonable Gap Between Sweeping Declaration
and Moderate Enforcement
Finding the right balance between the individualistic approach and
the family approach is by no means a simple matter. Bush & Folger
premised a theoretical foundation on thinking, which created a relational
worldview. This, in effect, constituted a bridge between the different
approaches, 195 but it has yet to be seen whether it is practical. In this
part, I shall look at one of the central solutions arising from the existing
models, which could lead to an interesting application of the relational
worldview.
We have seen the nature of the civil-rights intervention model is the
formation of a structured gap between sweeping intervention, expressed
in clear declarations regarding the supremacy of children's rights, and
moderate enforcement, but only in grievous or rare instances. And
indeed, there is no worry about a gap between sweeping declaration and
moderate enforcement. As noted, the goal is not always activation of the
sanction in practice.
It should be noted that there are other examples in parent/child
relationships of declarative sections of law that maintain the rationale of a
legal declaration not necessarily backed up by enforcement. For example,
Section 16 of the Legal Capacity and Guardianship Law in Israel,'
96
requires children to obey their parents in every matter subject to their
guardianship. Each child must maintain respect for their father and
mother. This section is derived from the fifth of the Biblical Ten
Commandments to "Honor thy father and thy mother." Israel does not, it
would seem, enforce this section in practice in tort laws or in any other
legal sphere. It is, indeed, difficult to imagine a situation in which this
section would be enforced in the gamut of the daily relationships in a
family. It cannot be expected that for every refusal of a child to do his/her
parents' bidding the child (at least above the age of twelve years, the age
of tort liability) would be exposed to a claim in tort against him by the
194. SEBBA, supra note 80, at 458-59.
195. BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 8, at 238-46.
196. Capacity Law, supra note 59.
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parents. Hence, Israeli law recognized in theory and practice the existence
of a section of law whose purpose is purely declarative, whose importance
is on the socio-value plain only, and not enforced by choice (and perhaps
even ab initio), in consequence of the daily family reality. The American
Restatement also talks about the non-immunity in principle of a child
against being sued by the parents,197 and here too an action by a parent
against a child has not been found.
The proposal here is to enforce, in a moderate fashion rather than
not at all. The rationale underlying the civil-rights intervention model
can be utilized for the purpose of this part of the proposed solution, both
with legislative action and with the action of the prosecutorial authorities
and judicial action.
"By legislative action" means legislation of a balanced section
"prohibiting" corporal punishment specifically in civil legislation, by
determining a suitable human right for children. The section could be
added, for example, to the Legal Capacity laws or to the children's rights
and family rights laws existing in many countries in the world.
Following is a proposed possible formulation, matching the range of
parental conducts:
The child shall be entitled to having any discipline vis-A-vis him/her
by a parent or other responsible person in loco parentis temporarily
or permanently, to whose authority the child is subject, administered
in a manner becoming to human dignity, to be exercised reasonably,
moderately and proportionately and he shall also be entitled to have
no hurtful, humiliating and demeaning physical disciplinary measures
activated against him/her.
The section starts with the premise that instilling discipline is a
positive action and is actually one of the child's rights. It is also part of
the parent's obligation to the child. The parent and his proxies must
navigate between the need to realize this right while not inflicting any
physical or mental injury on the child. The section applies both to
parents and anyone filling in for them provisionally or permanently (such
as step parents or foster parents), provided there exits an element of
authority over the child according the parent and caretaker a legal right to
impose discipline on the child. The section leaves no possibility for
physically or mentally injurious punitive measures or for demeaning or
humiliating measures. It contains foundations of reasonableness,
moderation, and proportionality to be filled with content in case law
which is handled in the next part.
197. Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 895G(2) (1977) (providing that "A parent or
child is not immune from tort liability to the other solely by reason of that
relationship ... ").
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The section is effectively restricted to two main situations. The first
situation is the possibility of imposing disciplinary measures which cause
no physical or mental harm. Corporal punishment is not included. The
second situation is the possibility of using force if not for a humiliating
or demeaning purpose, for example, to calm down a child having a
tantrum or protecting the child's life or that of another person against
something the child is doing. In such a case the action of the parent is
subject to the principles of reasonableness, moderation, and
proportionality.
"By action of the prosecutorial authorities," means the possibility of
prosecuting parents, but not in every instance of parental conduct even if
considered injurious. In cases of mild, moderate and reasonable corporal
punishment a policy of not prosecuting should be adopted. In other more
serious instances prosecution is, and should be a matter of routine.
"By judicial action" means implementing the possibility of moderate
enforcement alongside a sweeping declaration. There are two different
interpretations. First, in mild cases, a policy should be adopted of non-
conviction. Secondly, there should be a conviction in cases which are not
mild, but with special attention being given to consideration for the
rehabilitation of the family unit and restoration of its harmony, all being
with minimal harm to the other members of the family unit, including the
child who was the victim, particularly if the family has already been hurt
as a result of the actual legal process. It is incumbent upon the court to
take into account, when passing sentence, the current state of the
relationships between the parent and the child at the time of the hearing
rather than at the time when the offense was committed. In such a
situation, if there is data such as a probation report, reporting that the
relationship has improved since the incident and there is a good chance for
rehabilitation of the family unit, a therapeutic approach should be tried,
particularly if the child asks for this himself. The court can sometimes be
forgiving as far as enforcement of the norm is concerned, mainly in mild
cases where the motives are positive and educational and meant to assist
the family to get over the crisis.
19 8
When a file, which is suitable in principle for treatment and
rehabilitation, comes before the court, either because it was not referred to
the treatment track from the outset or because the circumstances changed
after the indictment was filed, the judge can make numerous decisions.
The first is to allow the treatment track even after legal procedures were
taken by postponing the judgment date in order to allow time for treatment
to run its course. Another possibility is to convict the parent in court but to
create a mechanism of punishment that ensures the non-dismemberment of
198. Cf Schuz 2003, supra note 100, at 247.
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the family unit. A third possibility is a final judgment (for example, a
probation order or public service work without a conviction) referring to
the treatment and rehabilitation track without a conviction. In many cases,
the third option is problematic because it nearly nullifies the deterrent
purpose; however, some cases do call for such a judgment. Either way, a
balance should be sought between considerations of deterrence and
rehabilitation in countries that have imposed a penal prohibition on
corporal punishment. A finger should also be kept on the national pulse to
sense developments which necessitate greater rigorousness, such as where
the conduct becomes a "national malaise" and so on.
If declarative legislation causes parents to fear being indicted the
legislation has served its purpose. But one has to be careful and exercise
caution not only over excessive enforcement, such as with the strict-
penal intervention model, but also over excessive forgiveness in cases
where there is no justification for such. When severe punishment has to
be administered, such should be done without concern or fear, lest there
be no deterrence and matters remain at a declarative level only. How can
the prosecutorial authorities and the courts know which cases necessitate
enforcement of the sweeping declaration? General sections of law do not
suffice. The determination relies on a list of guiding criteria. The next
part deals with this.
4. Presentation of Criteria for Criminal Prosecution
One cannot be satisfied with only the civil-rights intervention
model, that is, with the very creation of the gap between declaration and
enforcement. Because the gap is not at the level of a sweeping
declaration versus total non-enforcement, but at that of a sweeping
declaration versus moderate enforcement, the latter has to be expressed
in a list of criteria for directing conduct and for recognition of a criminal
action. General criteria based on reasonableness and moderation are not
always adequate. The legislature or the courts should be required to
specify more parameters and proper conduct for parents and educators.
Canadian law has done this to an extent, but it lacks a sweeping
declaration. There is, therefore, a place to present a list of guiding
criteria to both judges and parents so that parents will have the tools to
know how to act, and to judges so that they will have some guidance as
to how to rule, enabling uniformity in their judgments. The greater the
number of rules and criteria from the list upheld in a case will make it
easier for the court to determine whether the parent should be convicted.
The criteria are only guidelines and should, therefore, guide only, leaving
all matters to the judge's discretion. As follows, the criteria do not
constitute an exhaustive list:
[Vol. 26:1
2007] WHO'S AFRAID OF BANNING CORPORAL PUNISHMENT? 133
(1) The parental conduct is intentional and voluntary/willful or
reckless, with no good faith and not in the best interest of the child.
Cases of corporal punishment administered for the purpose of the child's
education are presumed to be such. Nonetheless, use of force against a
child, even moderate force, particularly if applied in a humiliating and
demeaning form does not stem from a positive and educational motive
and is not done in good faith or for the interest of the child.
(2) The extent of the desirability of the action taken. The
underlying motive for corporal punishment is affirmative, where as the
motive for neglect or abuse is negative. With respect to corporal
punishment, the dispute is inherent in the legitimacy of the parental action
and in the legal recognition of the remedy relative to the damage resulting
from such action. On the other hand, neglect does not prima facie disclose
any educational or other positive motive, therefore, a claim should be
welcomed, as is a claim with respect to actions that are not associated with
the competency of a parent, such as driving or labor relations, and it should
be equated with any other action that has no positive facet underlying it,
such as sexual abuse. Similarly, some importance should be attributed in
the penal aspect to the motive for the conduct. It has to be understood that
parents in many instances hit their children lightly out of love and are
certain they know how to educate them. The hitting is not done out of a
possessive perception. Even if the conduct is perceived as unacceptable
they cannot be considered parents who neglected or abused their
children.199 This is not to say that the moment an accused parent points to
a would-be educational motive, he or she should be acquitted. This is just
one of the proposed criteria and the motive has to be examined
punctiliously.
(3) Deviation from reasonableness, proportionality and
moderation in auctioning the parental conduct. Content has to be
poured into these principles by pointing to cases that prominently deviate
from them. 20 0 (1) The parental conduct is cruel and humiliating. Cruelty
is usually a sign of abuse. It can be expressed in the force of the blow,
the use of accessories, the explicit humiliation (for example, when
administered in public) and in anger accompanying the action. (2) The
parental conduct is ongoing and frequent. A one-time smack is not
similar to continuous hitting as part of the family's daily routine. Hence
it is not only the frequency of the act but also its duration at a given time.
An act which lasts a long time, even if not repeated with a high
199. Id.at250-51.
200. This is mainly in accordance with the reservations for corporal punishment as the
Canadian law has indicated and in accordance with the analysis of the definition of
"abuse" and the distinction between it and offenses of battery in the Israeli judgment in
Plonit.
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frequency, is more serious and may be assumed not to be proportionate,
moderate and reasonable. Frequent blows can turn into psychological
abuse. (3) The conduct is directed at a young child (ages zero to six
years) or at a child who has reached puberty (above the age of thirteen
years). (4) The nature of the child is not suitable for parental conduct,
for example, hitting a mentally retarded child or a very difficult child, or
where the punishment will only cause him/her to rebel, and so on.
(5) The proven injury is serious. The injury actually caused is certainly
important and can indicate, for example, the cruelty of the deeds. To this
end, the nature of the injury has to be checked in each case. It must also
be noted that a good portion of injuries do not come to light immediately,
but develop in the child during later stages of his life. (6) The gravity of
the deeds accompanying the corporal punishment. If the corporal
punishment is accompanied by verbal violence, neglect, degrading
confinement and so on, the whole gamut of the parental action should be
observed and forbidden.
(4) Safeguarding the integrity of the family unit as far as possible
in the circumstances of the case, and looking at the chance to repair
the tears and restore harmony to the family So long as there is a
possibility of restoring harmony, (the examination will be made by a direct
impression of the court in addition to obtaining a probation report or expert
opinion) the law should do its part in the attempt to rehabilitate the family
unit during sentencing. When the broken unit can no longer be called a
family and there is no possibility of rehabilitating it and of restoring the
harmony to it even partially, the action is similar to one between two de
facto strangers.
5. Examination of the Transfer of the Power to Hear Offenses
Within the Family to the Court for Family Affairs or to Specially Trained
Judges
In some countries there is no separate court for family affairs, or
such court does not have the jurisdiction to hear offenses in the
framework of the family but only matters of "pure" family law (adoption,
or custody and alimony disputes) and civil claims between members of
the family. Having well trained judges in this area of family law who
understand how punishment can impact the familial unit coupled with
proper approaches to mediation between the victim and the parent will
contribute to a more complete solution. Judges who are well aware of
the family conflict and do not view the dispute as being between two
strangers can create a gap between sweeping declaration and moderate
enforcement and if necessary punish severely. They have good tools to
refer the parties to rehabilitation and an understanding that the power of
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the law can make things worse especially in domestic disputes.
Alternatively, as a matter of routine, some judges in the criminal
courts can be referred for special training to specialize in offenses in the
family context and relevant files can be directed only to them.
V. Conclusion
Three years of hearings in a criminal case dealing primarily with
corporal punishment ended with these words of the Court:
The accused was suspended from his respectable position and
resigned from service of many years in the military. The couple, who
divorced before the complaint which led to the indictment, found
themselves sitting accused together, represented by two attorneys,
facing their son, the fruit of their union, who, after the filing of the
complaint, left the nuclear family and cut himself off from all
contact, direct or indirect, with all members of his family, leaving
himself alone in the world. And the son stands facing them on the
witness stand; points an accusing finger at them, all the while
desisting from calling them mother and father but referring to them
by their names; looks them straight in the eyes and describes-in
public, and in the presence of representatives of the media-what he
claims they did to him from the time he was three years old, as he
stood hesitant and introverted, hunched over and holding in his hands
a vest or bottle of drink; and later, as his testimony continued-
standing erect, confident, exaggerating somewhat, conversing,
laughing out loud, smiling, ridiculing, shedding a tear, sinking into
memories, and interested in continuation of the testimony and the
dialogue with him.., a great amount of patience and sensitivity were
required in this case; and from the start I knew that no legal result
would be "good" but would seriously hurt someone in this
disintegrating family, if not all of them... the accused-for their
part-fought for their good name, perhaps for their lives; were
concerned for their son and fearful for their future and the results of
the hearing.
201
In such cases there are no victors only vanquished. Legal
intervention in the issue of corporal punishment must not be too sweeping or
minimal and forgiving. The minimalist intervention is pass6 and no longer
is part of modem society, and that is good. A certain family space has to be
created but the family must not be abandoned enabling the strong to exploit
the weak. Every person has basic rights, among them equality and
safeguarding body and dignity. Strict-penal intervention, on the other hand,
which is at the other end of the spectrum, could destroy the nuclear family
201. Cr. F. (TA) 40076/00, State of Israel v. Ploni and Plonit, Tak-Mech para. 2-3.
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including the child.202
Legal intervention in parent/child relationships is itself welcome,
and a man's home does not have to remain a castle against the
intervention of the law, particularly if the parent in question is taking
painful and humiliating actions against his child. However, the State
should not always be related to as a "super-parent" while narrowing
parental discretion for educating their child, particularly in a multi-
cultural society. Legal intervention does not always have a result that
sits well with the best interest of the child. Strict-penal intervention
should be left for the grave cases and should be applied cautiously. It is
possible that in spousal relationships there is more reason to apply an
individualistic approach and equality in rights and duties, although even
there the family approach and the family as a unit have meaning. In
parent/child relationships, the application of such an approach is more
problematic since these relationships by their very nature are not
relationships of equality but of authority and a true equality between
parents and children will result in anarchy. Children will grow up wild
without principled frameworks, and parents will fear that any attempt to
intervene in the education of their child could put them in court as
accused or defendants. The moderate legal intervention model existing
in many countries, most notably the common law countries,
demonstrates a more considered and correct balance taking into account
world outlooks, beliefs and opinions in a multi-cultural society.
However, it looks at a situation from an overly paternalistic point of view
which does not adequately emphasize the rights of the child.
Corporal punishment is a classic example of the question of the
impact of social changes on the law and society. Should the law not take
a daring step forward because it does not find support for such a step in
public sentiment, for example, in the United States and seemingly also in
England, or should the law opt to try and change the reality and go forth
as a vanguard before the camp through civil-human rights statutes and
with a public-social campaign to introduce the norm, as is done in
Scandinavia and other countries in Europe, or in a severe manner as was
done in Cyprus through criminal legislation and in Israel through
criminal court rulings.2°3
202. Cf CA 2266/93, Anon v. Anon, 49(1) P.D. 221, 231, 237-9, at 260-1 (providing
a statement by the President of the Supreme Court in Israel, Meir Shamgar, "Greater
intervention by the State, through the Courts, in the decisions of parents vis-a-vis their
children ... grants the child a stronger standing within the family. The end of this
process is that it will also hurt the children themselves, for it has to be remembered that
the logic of the autonomy approach holds that the parents are the best decision makers for
their children. The concern is that undermining [the parents'] status in one context will
undermine all the family relationships.").
203. See MELVIN EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 19 (1988) (providing
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This Article integrates advantages from existing models with some
new concepts. As far as possible the proposal safeguards the rights of
the child without seriously harming the nuclear family. The Article
moves cautiously between two poles, with one rejecting intervention and
proposing leaving the family dynamic as is, and the other supporting
massive intervention because of the damage to the rights of the child, all
from an understanding that legal intrusion into the family has to be
intelligent both in nature and in scope. The Article tries to show that this
special unit has to be allowed to retain a certain measure of autonomy in
the conduct of its affairs. The proposal expresses a balanced
compromise between the models. The proposal does not exaggerate the
view of the individual's rights on account of the family's rights, even
though it does not in practice eat away at the child's rights. Additionally,
the proposal tries to view the picture as a whole and relate to the interest
of the child in its broadest sense while being concerned with the situation
where legal intervention will destroy the family.
The proposal relies on five central bases, some of them are
educational and preventative, in order to teach the parents to adopt
alternative paths to corporal punishment. This is for the purpose of
changing the norm among the public in a more convenient way allowing
for its true adoption.
The conclusion of this research is only the beginning. One could
examine other parental actions through the lens of the same models
including the proposed integrated model with the same tools, mutatis
mutandis. In those issues, one must understand that a dispute in the
family context is an expression of a serious ongoing crisis that harms all
members of the family. Any non-gentle legal intervention could make
the situation worse and the first to be harmed might again be the child. A
dispute in the family cannot be treated as a dispute between two
strangers.
a general discussion of the role of the court in the common law countries in deciding
between norms, one of which is more acceptable in society and the other less so, and in
accepting the first point of view presented above, according to which law is in effect a
reflection of social and ethical norms and does not advance alone without examination of
the accepted social norms); see Robert Gordon, Critical Legal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REv.
57, 93 (1984) (providing a view of the law a unifying glue containing the shared values of
the society); Warburg, supra note 25.

